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Abstract
This thesis investigates the value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in three game-theoretic
settings. I consider a player to be expert if they know the value of a particular payo↵-relevant
parameter in the models I study. If the player does not know such value, I consider the player to
be inexpert. A player is perceptive if they know with certainty whether their opponent is expert.
Otherwise, the player is imperceptive. The goal of this thesis is to provide insight regarding the
potential value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in the game-theoretic settings I study.
The first model I consider emulates a two-player, one-round game of poker. The second
model I investigate is a two-player market-entry game. The third model I study depicts a two-
player market-entry game that is influenced by an information designer who aims to maximize
producer surplus. In each model, I consider distinct information structures, which vary in terms
of the players’ levels of expertise and perceptiveness. In the first two models, I solve for the
Bayesian Nash equilibria of each game and compute each agent’s expected payo↵. Then, by
comparing the equilibrium action and expected payo↵ of an agent when perceptive to that when
imperceptive, holding all else constant, I determine the agent’s value of perceptiveness and the
e↵ect that perceptiveness has on the agent’s equilibrium strategy. In the third model, I solve
for the information designer’s attainable decision rules, then determine which of the attainable
decision rules maximizes producer surplus.
Among other insights, I find that perceptiveness is generally valuable, whether that be from
the perspective of a poker player, a player considering market entry, or an information designer
in a market-entry game. Furthermore, under an equilibrium that treats the market-entry players
as symmetrically as possible, the value of perceptiveness is positive when both players have a
su ciently high probability of being expert; whereas, the value of perceptiveness is zero when
either player is inexpert with a su ciently high probability. Also, perceptiveness is generally
less beneficial to players considering market entry than it is to players playing poker.
Keywords: Perceptiveness, game theory, market-entry, information design, poker, value of
information, Bayesian games, reading opponents
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis studies the value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in three game-theoretic set-
tings. I consider a player to be expert if they can discern their likelihood of realizing a high
payo↵ in a strategic setting. If the player cannot discern such, I consider the player to be in-
expert. A player is perceptive if they know with certainty whether their opponent is expert.
Otherwise, the player is imperceptive. The goal of this thesis is to provide insight regarding the
potential value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in the game-theoretic settings I study.
The first model I consider emulates a two-player, one-round game of poker. The second
model I investigate is a two-player market-entry game. The third model I study depicts a two-
player market-entry game that is influenced by a third player that can signal to the other two
players whether they should enter the market. The third player aims to maximize the combined
well-being of the two other players. In each model, I consider distinct endowments of infor-
mation between the players. These endowments vary in terms of the players’ expertise and
perceptiveness. By obtaining the solutions and expected payo↵s of a player when they are per-
ceptive, then comparing such to that when the player is imperceptive, I determine the player’s
value of perceptiveness and the e↵ect that perceptiveness has on the player’s strategy. In the
third model, I solve for the attainable signals that the third player can send, then determine
which signal maximizes the combined well-being of the other two players.
Among other insights, I find that perceptiveness is generally valuable in all three models.
Furthermore, using a solution that treats the market-entry players as symmetrically as possible,
the value of perceptiveness is positive when both players have a su ciently high probability
of being expert; whereas, the value of perceptiveness is zero when either player is inexpert
with a su ciently high probability. I also find that perceptiveness is generally less beneficial
to players considering market entry than it is to players playing poker.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In my thesis, I investigate the value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in various game-theoretic
settings. I consider a player to be expert if they know the value of a particular payo↵-relevant
parameter in the models I study. If the player does not know such value, I consider the player
to be inexpert. A player is perceptive if they know with certainty whether their opponent is
expert. Otherwise, the player is imperceptive.
To motivate the potential value and e↵ect of perceptiveness, consider the following ex-
ample. Suppose an entrepreneur develops a novel idea and is considering whether to take it
to market. The cost associated with entering the market will surely a↵ect the entrepreneur’s
market-entry decision. Similarly, the entrepreneur’s competitor’s market-entry decision will be
a↵ected by their own market-entry cost. Since the entrepreneur’s expected payo↵ from entering
the market will likely be a↵ected by their competitor’s market-entry decision, the competitor’s
information regarding their own market-entry cost will likely a↵ect the entrepreneur’s decision
as well. As a result, perceptiveness will likely a↵ect the entrepreneur’s market-entry decision.
Also, the entrepreneur could be better (or worse) o↵ by being perceptive. The goal of my the-
sis is to provide insight regarding the potential value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in three
di↵erent game-theoretic settings.
The first setting I consider, which is presented in Chapter 2, is a game-theoretic model that
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
emulates a two-player, one-round game of poker. I consider six distinct information structures,
which di↵er in terms of the players’ levels of expertise and perceptiveness. I solve for the
Bayesian Nash equilibria of each game and compute each agent’s expected payo↵. By com-
paring the equilibrium action and expected payo↵ of an agent when perceptive to that when
imperceptive, holding all else constant, I determine the agent’s value of perceptiveness and
the e↵ect that perceptiveness has on the agent’s equilibrium strategy. Among other insights, I
find that perceptiveness generally has significant value when the players’ chip endowment is
su ciently high.
The second setting I consider, which is presented in Chapter 3, studies the value and ef-
fect that perceptiveness has in a market-entry setting. I consider a continuum of information
structures, which (similar to the first setting) di↵er in terms of the players’ expertise and per-
ceptiveness. Upon deriving and refining the Bayesian Nash equilibria and computing each
agent’s expected payo↵, I determine the sign and magnitude of each agent’s value of percep-
tiveness. I find that, under an equilibrium that treats the players as symmetrically as possible,
the value of perceptiveness is always non-negative. Furthermore, the value of perceptiveness is
always zero for an inexpert agent whose opponent is perceptive. Also, when both players have
a su ciently high probability of being expert, the value of perceptiveness is positive; whereas,
if either agent is inexpert with a su ciently high probability, the value of perceptiveness is
zero. Additionally, even when the value of perceptiveness is zero, perceptiveness still a↵ects
the players’ equilibrium actions. I also find that perceptiveness is generally less beneficial in
this model as opposed to the model I consider in Chapter 2.
The third setting I consider, which is presented in Chapter 4, studies the e↵ect that percep-
tiveness has on an information design problem in a market-entry setting. Like the previous two
settings, I consider information structures that di↵er in terms of the players’ expertise and per-
ceptiveness. However, this setting also features an information designer that aims to maximize
producer surplus and can send action recommendations to each player prior to the players’
market-entry decision. I find that perceptiveness provides positive value, in terms of producer
3
surplus, when the di↵erence between the high and low state market-entry fees is su ciently
small, the high state market-entry fee is su ciently low, and the low state market-entry fee
is su ciently high. Furthermore, perceptiveness inflicts negative value, in terms of producer
surplus, when both the high and low market-entry fees are su ciently high or when the di↵er-
ence between the high and low state market-entry fees is su ciently small and the low state
market-entry fee is su ciently high.
Chapter 2
Perceptiveness in a Game-Theoretic
Model of Poker
“Once you’ve mastered the basic elements of a winning poker formula, psychology becomes
the key ingredient in separating break-even players from players who win consistently. The
most profitable kind of poker psychology is the ability to read your opponents.” (Caro, 2003,
p. 8)
2.1 Introduction
This quotation highlights the presence of two distinct skills required to be a successful poker
player. The first is expertise, which in poker can be thought of as a player’s ability to gauge how
strong their hand is relative to any competitior’s hand. The second is perceptiveness, which can
be thought of as a player’s ability to “read their opponents”.
There are several interpretations as to what “reading your opponents” entails. For instance,
it could refer to a player’s ability to discern their opponents’ level of expertise, or it could refer
to a player’s ability to accurately gauge their opponents’ hand strength based on a signal they
receive from such opponent. In this chapter, I focus on studying the e↵ect and value that a
player’s ability to discern their opponents’ level of expertise has in my game-theoretic model
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of poker.
My research in this chapter relates best to literature regarding the value of information1 and
literature regarding poker. Poker has been a topic of discussion among academic economists
for years, with works including von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Kuhn (1950), and Nash
and Shapley (1950). Poker has also been studied in various other fields of research including
computer science,2 psychology,3 and statistics.4 In addition to this, poker has intrigued many
casual players and non-academic authors who have discussed game theory optimal, exploita-
tive, and conventional poker strategy.
A small subset of influential poker literature includes Acevedo (2019), Harrington and
Robertie (2005), Little et al. (2015), and Snyder (2008).5 Acevedo (2019) presents an in-depth
analysis of game theory optimal play and how it applies to various situations in a No-Limit
Hold’em poker game. More specifically, Acevedo (2019) teaches readers how to apply game
theory in order to develop a non-exploitable poker strategy. Harrington and Robertie (2005)
teach fundamental poker strategy and establish Harrington’s M-ratio, which is a simple ratio
calculation that helps inform players how aggressively they should play in a particular poker
tournament situation. Little et al. (2015) provides a comprehensive review of modern, expert
poker strategy. Some of the broad range of topics covered in Little et al. (2015) include
range analysis, satellite play, game theory optimal play, and mental toughness. Snyder (2008)
establishes the importance of chip utility, which is founded upon the fact that the more chips a
player has in a poker tournament, the more strategies that player can utilize to accumulate even
more chips.
Most of the non-academic poker literature, including the literature I reference here, fo-
cuses on developing a poker strategy that can be applied while playing poker. My research in
this chapter departs from this, but still contributes to poker literature, since I develop a game-
1I address the value of information literature in Chapter 3.
2For instance Billings et al. (2003), Korb et al. (1999), Shi and Littman (2000), and Southey et al. (2012).
3For instance Gri ths et al. (2010), McCormack and Gri ths (2012), and Rapoport et al. (1997).
4For instance Borm and van der Genugten (2000, 2001), and Crosen et al. (2008).
5I listed these four poker books in particular since they have had the most substantial influence on the poker
strategy I use when playing.
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theoretic model of poker that incorporates perceptiveness. I also provide insight regarding the
value of perceptiveness and the e↵ect that perceptiveness has on a player’s equilibrium strategy
in my model of poker. Although it is not my intention to provide an applicable poker strategy,
I believe that my model and results confirm conventional poker wisdom that recommends ag-
gressive play when facing an opponent who you know is inexpert.
In addition to the poker literature from academic fields outside of economics that I cite
above, many studies have focused on examining the behavioural tendencies of players or em-
pirically determining whether poker is a game of luck or skill. Siler (2010) finds that a tight-
aggressive strategy (which is where a player plays their hands aggressively, but only plays
hands that have an expectation above a particular threshold) tends to be the most lucrative
strategy for expert players. Levitt and Miles (2014), Hannum and Cabot (2009), and Meyer et
al. (2013) empirically test the relationship between luck and skill in poker. The two former
papers find that poker is a game of skill, whereas the latter finds that poker is a game of luck.
This is a common debate among poker enthusiasts. From my personal experience, I believe
poker to be both a game of luck and a game of skill. Bad luck can ultimately destroy any good
player’s chance at success. However, in order to win, a highly skilled poker player needs far
less good luck than a lesser skilled poker player. Therefore, I believe that both luck and skill
are important to achieving poker success.
The model I develop is also related to literature on higher-order beliefs, games of incom-
plete information, and epistemic game theory. Aumann and Heifetz (2002) acknowledges the
importance, and details various methods, of incorporating players’ beliefs of the other players’
beliefs into game-theoretic models. I do this in my model by constructing perceptiveness as
a player’s ability to identify whether their opponent knows their own relative hand strength.
Jehiel and Koessler (2008) studies the e↵ect of analogy-based expectations in static two-player
games of incomplete information by assuming that players understand the average behavior of
their opponent over bundles of states, then act on the best responses to their opponent’s average
behaviour. My work di↵ers from Jehiel and Koessler (2008) as the players in my model act
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using best responses that are derived from a probabilistic distribution over di↵erent levels of
their opponent’s expertise, whereas Jehiel and Koessler (2008) derive best responses based on a
probabilistic distribution over a bundle of states. I also investigate the value of perceptiveness,
whereas Jehiel and Koessler (2008) focuses solely on the e↵ect of analogy-based expectations.
Friedenberg et al. (2016) studies rationality (a player’s tendency to act using a best response)
and cognition (a player’s tendency to apply some alternative rationale, such as using their best
response or using a strategy based on their lucky numbers, to playing a game). They find that
rationality is important when determining player behaviour, especially for cognitive players.
My work departs from this since I assume all players to be rational and study a player’s infor-
mation about how much their opponent knows, as opposed to studying a player’s information
about whether their opponents’ simply have a rational method behind their actions.
Additionally, my work in this chapter relates to economics literature pertaining to over-
confidence and other personality traits in strategic settings. Ando (2004) investigates an eco-
nomic contest featuring two players that are each overconfident with their relative abilities,
then specifically studies two unique sources of overconfidence: a player’s overestimation of
their own ability and a player’s underestimation of their opponent’s ability. Ando (2004) finds
that a player’s overestimation of their own ability always induces the player to become more
aggressive, whereas a player’s underestimation of their opponents’ ability sometimes induces
the player to become more passive; thus implying that overconfidence may not always lead to
aggressive tendencies. Ludwig et al. (2011) uses a model that features a two-player Tullock
contest to show that modest overconfidence can improve a player’s performance relative to an
unbiased opponent, and thus leads to an absolute advantage for the overconfident player. My
work provides an example of how a player’s overestimation of their opponent’s ability leads to
behaviour that is relatively more passive.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly discusses poker and
how it is played. Section 2.3 presents the model. Section 2.4 provides details regarding the
strategies, best responses, equilibria, and expected payo↵s. Section 2.5 reports the value of
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expertise and the value of perceptiveness, as well as a discussion on the value and e↵ect that
perceptiveness has in this chapter’s model. Section 2.6 concludes. The supplemental appendix
for this chapter is located in Appendix A.
2.2 Preliminaries
Poker is a collection of card games that combine gambling, skill, and strategy. A game of poker
begins with each player having a certain number of chips, which can be thought of as a player’s
capital. A series of hands are then dealt among the players. In each hand, players receive cards
and try to make the highest-ranking card combination possible. Throughout each hand, players
can place bets to either increase the number of chips the winning player will receive or to
attempt to win the hand immediately. Players must also periodically decide whether to remain
in the hand by matching the bets made by other players. When a player decides not to match an
opponent’s bet, the player is eliminated from the hand. A player wins a hand and collects all of
the wagered chips if all other players have been eliminated or if they have the highest-ranking
card combination after the final betting round.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Inspiration
To induce action in a game of poker, players may have to pay “blinds” and/or “antes” at the start
of each hand. A common, and almost inevitable, occurrence in any poker tournament is when
these forced bets are a high proportion of the players’ total number of chips. In this situation, a
popular and e↵ective strategy is to either “fold” or go “all-in” in the first betting round. When
a player folds they relinquish their hand and forfeit their chance of winning all chips wagered
throughout the hand. When a player goes all-in, they maintain their chance of winning the hand
(and all of the chips wagered), but also risk all of their chips in the process. This approach is
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e↵ective since going all-in negates the other players’ chance of winning the hand by betting.
This means that the winning player will win the hand by matching all bets and having the
highest-ranking card combination of all players that matched such bets. Furthermore, if no
opponent decides to match the player’s all-in bet, the reward the player receives from winning
the hand is relatively large since the forced bets are a high proportion of the player’s total
number of chips. The model I develop in this chapter emulates the first betting round in a
two-player poker hand, in which each player can either go all-in or fold.
2.3.2 Players, Actions, States
Suppose there are two risk-neutral players, A and B, that are both endowed with chips and
receive a hand that is drawn by Nature. Upon receiving their hand, each player must choose
whether to “fold” (ai = F) or go “all-in” (ai = A). Player i’s payo↵ function is6
ui(ai, aj, hi, hj) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0, if (ai, aj) = (F, F)
1, if (ai, aj) = (A, F)
 1, if (ai, aj) = (F, A)
0, if (ai, aj) = (A, A) & hi = hj
K, if (ai, aj) = (A, A) & hi > hj
 K, if (ai, aj) = (A, A) & hi < hj.
I let {K   1|K 2 R} and hi ⇠ i.i.d. U[0,1]. In this setting, K represents the players’ chip
endowment, and hi represents the value of player i’s hand. The set of states is [0,1]2, which
corresponds to the possible hand combinations that can be drawn between the two players.
6 j will always denote i’s opponent.
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2.3.3 Types, Information, & Beliefs
In this chapter, I consider six distinct information structures. I will construct the Bayesian Nash
equilibria and expected payo↵s for each information structure separately, then use the results
to determine the value and e↵ect of perceptiveness. The six information structures I consider
are
(✏A, ✏B) 2 {(0,0), (0,1), (1,1), (0,1/2), (1,1/2), (1/2,1/2)}, (2.1)
where ✏i represents player j’s probabilistic belief of player i knowing the value of hi. Each
(✏A, ✏B) ordered pair is common knowledge to both players and corresponds to a specific in-
formation structure. For instance, suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). Here, ✏ j = 1/2, which implies
that player i knows that player j knows the value of hj with a probability of 1/2.7 For a second
example, suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1). Here, player A knows that player B knows the value of hB;
whereas, B knows that A merely knows that hA ⇠ iid U[0,1]. Furthermore, both players know
the probability that the other player believes them to know the value of their hand.
Definition 2.3.1 Player i is perceptive if player i knows with certainty whether player j knows
the value of h j.
Definition 2.3.1 classifies player i as perceptive if and only if ✏ j 2 {0,1}. Hence, player i
is imperceptive if and only if ✏ j 2 (0,1). As shown by Reza (1994), uncertainty is maximized
when all potential outcomes occur with equal probability. Hence, the most imperceptive player
i can be occurs when ✏ j = 1/2. For this reason, I have chosen ✏i = 1/2 as the imperceptive
class of games I study in this chapter. Since (✏A, ✏B) is common knowledge, each player’s
perceptiveness is common knowledge as well.
Definition 2.3.2 Player i is expert if player i knows the value of hi prior to deciding whether
to go all-in or fold.
7I consider i’s belief to be an accurate gauge of j’s probability of knowing the value of h j. That is, if i believes
j knows h j with probability ✏ j, then ex-ante j knows h j with probability ✏ j.
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Definition 2.3.2 classifies player i as expert if and only if player i knows the value of hi
prior to deciding whether to go all-in or fold. If player i is not expert, I classify player i as
inexpert.
The type space, ti, for each player i varies depending on the value of ✏i. If ✏i = 0, the type
space for i is ti 2 {Ii}. If ✏i = 1, the type space for i is ti 2 [0,1]. If ✏i 2 (0,1), the type space for
i is ti 2 [0,1] [ {Ii}. When ✏i = 0, j is perceptive and i merely knows that hi ⇠ iid U[0,1]. As a
result, i only has one type, which I denote as Ii. When ✏i = 1, j is perceptive and i knows the
value of hi. As a result, i has a continuum of types, each corresponding to a particular value
of hi. Finally, when ✏i 2 (0,1), j is imperceptive so it is conceivable for i to be either expert or
inexpert, and hence have a type space of [0,1] [ {Ii}.
By considering the six information structures listed in Expression (2.1), I cover every player
configuration possibility, given that any imperceptive player i has an opponent j such that
✏ j = 1/2. Since my model features two levels of expertise and two levels of perceptiveness,
there are four configuration possibilities for each player. These are: 1) expert, perceptive;
2) inexpert, perceptive; 3) expert, imperceptive; and 4) inexpert, imperceptive. Therefore,
there are sixteen total configurations, which can be reduced to six by excluding symmetric and
redundant8 configurations.
2.3.4 Timeline
The timeline for the game in this chapter is as follows. First, each player observes (✏A, ✏B) and
learns whether they are expert or inexpert. Second, each player i receives their draw of hi,
which player i observes if i is expert. Third, players simultaneously choose to either fold or go
all-in. Fourth, the hand values are revealed to both players and payo↵s are realized.
8By redundant, I refer to configurations that have the existence of multiple agents for one player. That is, when
player i is imperceptive, there will be two agents for player j, one for each level of expertise. In my analysis, I
group these configuration possibilities together into one game.
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2.4 Strategies, Best Responses, & Equilibria
2.4.1 Strategies
A strategy maps each type to a probability distribution over actions. Therefore, I must define a
strategy for each level of expertise since the type space for an expert agent is [0,1] and the type
space for an inexpert agent is {Ii}. Since an expert agent i knows the value of hi, this information
should a↵ect their strategy since i’s expected payo↵ depends on hi. Since i’s expected payo↵
is increasing in hi,9 I restrict attention to cut-o↵ strategies for an expert agent i. I let  i, where
 i 2 [0,1], represent an expert agent i’s cut-o↵, such that i chooses to fold for all hi <  i and
chooses all-in for all hi    i.10
An inexpert agent i does not know the value of hi prior to deciding whether to fold or go
all-in, which is depicted by an inexpert i’s type space of {Ii}. Therefore, an inexpert i’s strategy
should not depend on hi. I let ↵i, where ↵i 2 [0,1], represent the probability that an inexpert
agent i chooses to fold.11
2.4.2 Best Responses
Before constructing the best response functions, I derive each agent’s expected payo↵ from
choosing fold and from choosing all-in. I denote agent i’s expected payo↵ from choosing ai as
E[uaii,q(  j,↵ j)], where q 2 {EX, IX} denotes agent i’s expertise.12 Since an agent i that chooses
fold has a payo↵ that is independent of hi, an agent’s expected payo↵ from choosing fold is
independent of their expertise. Hence an expert or inexpert agent i’s expected payo↵ from
choosing fold is
9To see this, consider the expression for ui listed in Section 2.3.2. Player i’s expected payo↵ from choosing
fold is constant in hi, whereas i’s expected payo↵ from choosing all-in increases in hi, given some arbitrary h j.
10I restrict attention to equilibria where an expert i chooses all-in if they are indi↵erent between the two actions.
11Hence, an inexpert i chooses all-in with probability 1 ↵i.
12EX indicates that i is expert, whereas IX indicates that i is inexpert.
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E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = ✏ j[Pr(aj=F | j=EX)(0) + Pr(aj=A | j=EX)( 1)]
+ (1 ✏ j)[Pr(aj=F | j=IX)(0) + Pr(aj=A | j=IX)( 1)]
=  ✏ j(1   j)   (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)
= ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1. (2.2)
An inexpert agent i’s expected payo↵ from choosing all-in is13
E[uAi,IX(  j,↵ j)] =
✏ j[Pr(aj=F | j=EX)(1) + Pr(aj=A | j=EX)
· [Pr(hi>hj | hj     j)K + Pr(hi<hj | hj     j)( K) + Pr(hi=hj | hj     j)(0)]]
+ (1 ✏ j)[Pr(aj=F | j=IX)(1)
+ Pr(aj=A | j=IX)[Pr(hi>hj)K + Pr(hi<hj)( K) + Pr(hi=hj)(0)]]
= ✏ j[  j + (1   j)[  j( K) + 12 (1   j)(K) + 12 (1   j)( K)]] + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)K(0)]
= ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ✏ j  j(1   j)K. (2.3)
Lastly, an expert agent i’s expected payo↵ from choosing all-in is
13Appendix A.1 provides a breakdown of the possible states and the corresponding payo↵ that an inexpert agent
i receives when choosing all-in against an expert agent j, given that j uses a cut-o↵ strategy,   j.
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E[uAi,EX(  j,↵ j)] =
✏ j[Pr(aj=F | j=EX)(1) + Pr(aj=A | j=EX)[Pr(hi > hj | hj     j)K
+ Pr(hi < hj | hj     j)( K) + Pr(hi = hj | hj     j)(0)]]
+ (1 ✏ j)[Pr(aj=F | j=IX)(1)
+ Pr(aj=A | j=IX)[Pr(hi > hj)K + Pr(hi < hj)( K) + Pr(hi = hj)(0)]]
= ✏ j(  j + [Pr(hi <   j)( K) + Pr(hi     j)[(hi   j)K + (1 hi)( K)]])
+ (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]
= ✏ j  j + ✏ jK[Pr(hi     j)(2hi   j 1)   Pr(hi <   j)] + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]
= ✏ j  j + ✏ jK[Pr(hi     j)(2hi   j)   (Pr(hi     j) + Pr(hi <   j))]
+ (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]
= ✏ j  j + Pr(hi     j)(2hi   j)✏ jK   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K] (2.4)
=
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K] + ✏ j(2hi   j)K if hi     j
✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K] if hi <   j
(2.5)
To solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibria for the six information structures listed in Ex-
pression (2.1), there are six best response functions I require. These six best response functions
are for an
i inexpert & perceptive agent i versus an inexpert agent j;
ii expert & perceptive agent i versus an inexpert agent j;
iii inexpert & perceptive agent i versus an expert agent j;
iv expert & perceptive agent i versus an expert agent j;
v inexpert & imperceptive agent i;
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vi expert & imperceptive agent i.
Any agent i’s best response function is independent of j’s perceptiveness. This is because
j’s perceptiveness will a↵ect j’s best response function, which will in turn a↵ect j’s strategy
variables,   j and ↵ j. Although these variables substitute into i’s best response function, the
function itself will remain unchanged if j’s perceptiveness were to change. Additionally, since
an imperceptive agent i is unable to discern j’s expertise, i’s best response function is indepen-
dent of j’s expertise.
Inexpert & Perceptive vs. Inexpert
Lemma 2.4.1 Suppose an inexpert, perceptive agent i is facing an inexpert opponent j. Agent
i’s best response is to choose all-in, ↵BRi = 0, for all K   1.
Proof Suppose i is inexpert, perceptive and j is inexpert. This implies that ✏ j = 0. By Equa-
tions (2.2) and (2.3), i’s expectation from choosing all-in will be greater than or equal to i’s
expectation from choosing fold if and only if
E[uAi,IX(  j,↵ j)]   E[uFi (  j,↵ j)]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ✏ j  j(1   j)K   ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1.
This expression, when ✏ j = 0, simplifies to 0    1. Therefore, agent i’s expected payo↵ from
choosing all-in is greater than i’s expected payo↵ from choosing fold for all K   1.
Expert & Perceptive vs. Inexpert
Lemma 2.4.2 Suppose an expert, perceptive agent i faces an inexpert opponent j. Agent i’s
best response is to, for all K   1, choose the cut-o↵
 BRi (↵ j) = Max{ 12 (1  1(1 ↵ j)K ), 0}.
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Proof Suppose i is expert, perceptive and j is inexpert. This implies that ✏ j = 0. By Equations
(2.2) and (2.5), i should select  i such that i is indi↵erent between actions.14 If no indi↵erence
point exists, i should select whichever action yields the highest expected payo↵. Therefore, if
hi     j,
E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = E[u
A
i,EX(  j,↵ j)|hi     j]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1 = ✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K] + ✏ j(2hi   j)K
 i(↵ j) = 12 (1  1(1 ↵ j)K ),
while if hi <   j,
E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = E[u
A
i,EX(  j,↵ j)|hi <   j]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1 = ✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]
 i(↵ j) = 12 (1  1(1 ↵ j)K ).
Since  i 2 [0,1], the lowest value that i can select for  i is zero. Moreover, 12 (1  1(1 ↵ j)K ) is
bounded above by 1/2. Therefore,
 BRi (↵ j) = Max{ 12 (1  1(1 ↵ j)K ), 0},
for all K   1 when i is expert, perceptive and facing an inexpert opponent j.
In this situation, agent i’s expected payo↵ from choosing all-in may be greater than their
expected payo↵ from choosing fold for all K   1. This depends on the inexpert j’s strategy, ↵ j.
 BRi (↵ j) is bounded above by 1/2, but diverges to  1 as ↵ j approaches 1 (which occurs when j
always chooses fold). The intuition behind this is that if an inexpert j chooses to fold with a
su ciently high frequency, the expert i should always choose all-in in order to receive the ante
that j often relinquishes by choosing fold.
14When i is indi↵erent between choosing all-in and fold, hi =  i.
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Inexpert & Perceptive vs. Expert
Lemma 2.4.3 Suppose an inexpert, perceptive agent i is facing an expert opponent j. Agent
i’s best response correspondence, for all K   1, is
↵BRi (  j) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
{1} if  2j     j + 1K < 0
{0} if  2j     j + 1K > 0
[0,1] if  2j     j + 1K = 0.
Proof Suppose i is inexpert, perceptive and j is expert. This implies that ✏ j = 1. By Equa-
tions (2.2) and (2.3), i’s expectation from choosing all-in will be greater than or equal to i’s
expectation from choosing fold if and only if
E[uAi,IX(  j,↵ j)]   E[uFi (  j,↵ j)]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ✏ j  j(1   j)K   ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1
 2j     j + 1K   0.
Therefore, for all K   1, when i is inexpert, perceptive and facing an expert opponent j, i
should always choose all-in if  2j     j + 1K > 0 and always choose fold if  2j     j + 1K < 0.
Furthermore, if  2j     j + 1K = 0, then i will be indi↵erent between the two actions.
Expert & Perceptive vs. Expert
Lemma 2.4.4 Suppose an expert, perceptive agent i faces an expert opponent j. Agent i’s best
response is to, for all K   1, choose the cut-o↵
 BRi (  j) =
1
2 (1  1K+  j),
when hi     j, and to choose fold ( i =   j) when hi <   j.
Proof Suppose i is expert, perceptive and j is expert. This implies that ✏ j = 1. By Equations
(2.2) and (2.5), i should select  i such that i is indi↵erent between actions. If no indi↵erence
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point exists, i should select whichever action yields the highest expected payo↵. Therefore, if
hi     j, then
E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = E[u
A
i,EX(  j,↵ j)|hi     j]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1 = ✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K] + ✏ j(2hi   j)K
 i(  j) = 12 (1  1K+  j),
while if hi <   j,
E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = E[u
A
i,EX(  j,↵ j)|hi <   j]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1 = ✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]
K = 1.
Since K   1, this implies that if hi <   j, agent i will be at least weakly better o↵ by choosing to
fold when hi <   j, given that i is expert, perceptive and j is expert. Since, in this case, hi <   j,
by setting  i =   j, i will choose fold when hi <   j.
Inexpert & Imperceptive
Lemma 2.4.5 Suppose i is inexpert and imperceptive. Agent i’s best response correspondence,
for all K   1, is
↵BRi (  j,↵ j) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
{1} if  2j     j + 2K < 0
{0} if  2j     j + 2K > 0
[0,1] if  2j     j + 2K = 0.
Proof Suppose i is inexpert and imperceptive. This implies that ✏ j = 1/2. By Equations (2.2)
and (2.3), i’s expectation from choosing all-in will be greater than or equal to i’s expectation
from choosing fold if and only if
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E[uAi,IX(  j,↵ j)]   E[uFi (  j,↵ j)]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ✏ j  j(1   j)K   ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1
1   12  j(1   j)K
 2j     j + 2K   0.
Therefore, for all K   1, when i is inexpert and imperceptive, i should always choose all-in if
 2j     j + 2K > 0 and always choose fold if  2j     j + 2K < 0. Furthermore, if  2j     j + 2K = 0,
then i will be indi↵erent between the two actions.
Expert & Imperceptive
Lemma 2.4.6 Suppose i is expert and imperceptive. Agent i’s best response is to, for all K   1,
choose the cut-o↵
 BRi (  j,↵ j) =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
Max{ 12+ 12(2 ↵ j) (  j 
2
K ), 0}, if hi     j
Min{Max{ 12+ 12(1 ↵ j) (1 
2
K ), 0}, 1}, if hi <   j.
Proof Suppose i is expert and imperceptive. This implies that ✏ j = 1/2. By Equations (2.2) and
(2.5), i should select  i such that i is indi↵erent between actions. If no indi↵erence point exists,
i should select whichever action yields the highest expected payo↵. Therefore, if hi     j,
E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = E[u
A
i,EX(  j,↵ j)|hi     j]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1 = ✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K] + ✏ j(2hi   j)K
 i(  j,↵ j) = 12 +
1
2(2 ↵ j) (  j 
2
K ),
while if hi <   j,
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E[uFi (  j,↵ j)] = E[u
A
i,EX(  j,↵ j)|hi <   j]
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1 = ✏ j  j   ✏ jK + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]
 i(  j,↵ j) = 12 +
1
2(1 ↵ j) (1 
2
K ).
Since  i 2 [0,1], the lowest (highest) value that i can select for  i is zero (one). Therefore,
 BRi (  j,↵ j) =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
Max{ 12+ 12(2 ↵ j) (  j 
2
K ), 0}, if hi     j
Min{Max{12+ 12(1 ↵ j) (1 
2
K ), 0}, 1}, if hi <   j,
for all K   1 when i is expert and imperceptive.15
In this situation, agent i’s expected payo↵ from choosing all-in may be greater than or less
than their expected payo↵ from choosing fold for some K   1. This depends on j’s inexpert
strategy (↵ j) and j’s expert strategy (  j). If hi     j, then  BRi is bounded above by 1, but  BRi < 0
when 1  1K < 12 (↵ j   j). Hence, if hi     j and 1  1K < 12 (↵ j   j), an expert, imperceptive agent
i’s best response is to always choose all-in. Similarly, if hi <   j, then  BRi > 1 when ↵ j >
2
K ,
and  BRi < 0 when ↵ j > 2(1  1K ). This implies that if K is high enough to make ↵ j > 2K , an
expert, imperceptive agent i’s best response is to always fold. Whereas, if K is low enough to
make ↵ j > 2(1  1K ), an expert, imperceptive agent i’s best response is to always go all-in. The
intuition behind this is that if the number of chips that i can lose is su ciently high, then i is
better o↵ by taking a guaranteed loss of one chip, as opposed to risking all of their chips by
going all-in when hi <   j. Similarly, if the number of chips that i can lose is su ciently low,
then i is better o↵ risking all of their chips when hi <   j, on the o↵ chance that j folds.
15The expression 12+
1
2(2 ↵ j) (  j 
2
K ) is bounded above by 1 and can be less than 0. Additionally, the expression
1
2+
1
2(1 ↵ j) (1 
2
K ) can be greater than 1 or less than 0.
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2.4.3 Equilibria
Using the best responses given by Lemmas 2.4.1-2.4.6, I derive the Bayesian Nash equilibria
for each of the six information structures listed in Expression (2.1). I restrict attention to
symmetric equilibria when two agents are symmetric.16 Solving for each equilibrium is tedious,
but straightforward. Each agent will have a best response, given by one of Lemmas 2.4.1-2.4.6.
When there are x agents, such that x 2 {2, 3, 4}, there will be x best response functions and x
variables to solve for. As a result, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be found by setting up
and solving the applicable system of equations.
Information Structure: (✏A, ✏B) = (0,0)
Theorem 2.4.7 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (0,0). This implies that both players are inexpert and per-
ceptive. Furthermore, for all K   1, the unique equilibrium is
(↵⇤A,↵
⇤
B) = (0, 0).
Proof This proof follows directly from Lemma 2.4.1.
Information Structure: (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1)
Theorem 2.4.8 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1). This implies that player A is inexpert and perceptive,
whereas player B is expert and perceptive. Furthermore, the unique equilibrium is
(↵⇤A,  
⇤
B) =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
(0, 12 [1  1K ]), if K 2 [1, 2+
p
5]
(1  1pK(K 4) ,
1
2 [1 
q
1  4K ]), if K > 2+
p
5.
Proof This proof follows directly from Lemmas 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.
16For instance, in the game (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2), the two inexpert agents will be symmetric and the two expert
agents will be symmetric. Whereas, in the game (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1/2), the two inexpert agents will not be symmetric
since ✏A , ✏B.
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Information Structure: (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1)
Theorem 2.4.9 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1). This implies that both players are expert and percep-
tive. Furthermore, for all K   1, the unique equilibrium is
( ⇤A,  
⇤
B) = (1  1K , 1  1K ).
Proof This proof follows directly from Lemma 2.4.4.
Information Structure: (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1/2)
Theorem 2.4.10 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1/2). This implies that player A is inexpert and imper-
ceptive, whereas player B is perceptive. Furthermore, the unique equilibrium is
(↵⇤A,  
⇤
B,↵
⇤
B) =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
(0, 12 [1  1K ], 0), if K 2 [1, 4+
p
17]
(1  1pK(K 8) ,
1
2 [1 
q
1  8K ], 0), if K > 4+
p
17.
Proof This proof follows directly from Lemmas 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.5.
Information Structure: (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1/2)
Theorem 2.4.11 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1/2). This implies that player A is expert and impercep-
tive, whereas player B is perceptive. Furthermore, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
( ⇤A,  
⇤
B,↵
⇤
B) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
( 57 [1  1K ], 67 [1  1K ], 0), if K 2 [1, 1.7+0.7
p
11]
(12[1+
q
1  4K ], 14 [3  2K+
q
1  4K ], 14 [7  3K 10pK(K 4) ]), if K 2 (1.7+0.7
p
11, 256 ]
(1  53K , 1  43K , 1), if K > 256 .
Proof This proof follows directly from Lemmas 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.6.
The equilibrium listed in Theorem 2.4.11 is not unique since
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( ⇤A,  
⇤
B,↵
⇤
B) = (1  1K , 1  1K , 0)
also exists as an equilibrium, for all K   1. I restrict attention to the equilibrium listed in
Theorem 2.4.11 since it captures a change, from the (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1) information structure, in
the expert agents’ equilibrium strategy.
Information Structure: (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2)
Theorem 2.4.12 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). This implies that both players are imperceptive.
Furthermore, a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
( ⇤A,↵
⇤
A,  
⇤
B,↵
⇤
B) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
(23 [1  1K ], 0, 23 [1  1K ], 0), if K 2 [1, 4+3
p
2]
(12[1+
q
1  8K ], 12 [3  K 4pK(K 8) ],
1
2 [1+
q
1  8K ], 12 [3  K 4pK(K 8) ]), if K > 4+3
p
2.
Proof This proof follows directly from Lemmas 2.4.5 and 2.4.6.
The equilibrium listed in Theorem 2.4.12 is not unique since
( ⇤A,↵
⇤
A,  
⇤
B,↵
⇤
B) = (1  1K , 0, 1  1K , 0)
also exists as an equilibrium, for all K   1. I restrict attention to the equilibrium listed in
Theorem 2.4.12 since it captures a change, from the (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1) information structure, in
the expert agents’ equilibrium strategy. Figures 2.1-2.6 give visual depictions of each agent’s
equilibrium strategy for K 2 [1, 20], for each of the six information structures I consider.
2.4.4 Ex-Ante Expected Payo↵s
The ex-ante expected payo↵ for agent i can be determined by integrating i’s best response ex-
pected payo↵ for all possible draws of hi. Lemmas 2.4.13 and 2.4.14 formalize these functions.
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium strategies when (✏A, ✏B) = (0,0).
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium strategies when (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1).
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium strategies when (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1).
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium strategies when (✏A, ✏B) = (0,1/2).
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium strategies when (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1/2).
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium strategies when (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2).
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Lemma 2.4.13 Suppose agent i is expert and  i    j. Agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUi,EX( i,   j,↵ j) = ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j    i + K(1  i)[ i (1 ✏ j)↵ j i]   ✏ j  jK + ✏ jK 2i .
Additionally, suppose agent i is expert and  i     j. Agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUi,EX( i,   j,↵ j) = ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j    i + K(1  i)[ i (1 ✏ j)↵ j i]   ✏ j  jK + ✏ jK i  j.
Proof Suppose agent i is expert and that  i    j. Agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUi,EX( i,   j,↵ j) =
Z  i
0
E[uFi,EX(  j,↵ j)] dhi+
Z   j
 i
E[uAi,EX(  j,↵ j)] dhi+
Z 1
  j
E[uAi,EX(  j,↵ j)] dhi
=
Z  i
0
(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1) dhi
+
Z   j
 i
(✏ j[  j K] + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j + (1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]) dhi
+
Z 1
  j
(✏ j[  j K+(2hi   j)K] + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j+(1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]) dhi
= ✏ j  j i+(1 ✏ j)↵ j i  i + ✏ j(  j K)(  j  i) + (1 ✏ j)↵ j(  j  i)
  (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)K(  j  i) + (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)K[ 2j  2i ]
+ ✏ j(  j K)(1   j)   ✏ j  jK(1   j) + ✏ jK(1  2j)
+ (1 ✏ j)↵ j(1   j)   (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)K(1   j) + (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)K[1  2j]
= ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j    i + K i(1  i)[1 (1 ✏ j)↵ j]   ✏ j  jK + ✏ jK 2i .
Now suppose agent i is expert and that  i     j. Agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUi,EX( i,   j,↵ j) =
Z  i
0
E[uFi,EX(  j,↵ j)] dhi +
Z 1
 i
E[uAi,EX(  j,↵ j)] dhi
=
Z  i
0
(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1) dhi
+
Z 1
 i
(✏ j[  j K+(2hi   j)K] + (1 ✏ j)[↵ j+(1 ↵ j)(2hi 1)K]) dhi
= [✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1] i
+ ✏ j  j(1  i)   ✏ jK(1  i)   ✏ j  jK(1  i) + ✏ jK(1  2i )
+ (1 ✏ j)↵ j(1  i)   (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)K(1  i) + (1 ✏ j)(1 ↵ j)K(1  2i )
= ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j    i + K i(1  i)[1 (1 ✏ j)↵ j]   ✏ j  jK + ✏ jK i  j.
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Lemma 2.4.14 Suppose agent i is inexpert. Agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUi,IX(↵i,   j,↵ j) = ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ↵i   ✏ j(1 ↵i)  j(1   j)K.
Proof Suppose agent i is inexpert. Agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUi,IX(↵i,   j,↵ j) = ↵i
Z 1
0
E[uFi,IX(  j,↵ j)] dhi + (1 ↵i)
Z 1
0
E[uAi,IX(  j,↵ j)] dhi
= ↵i
Z 1
0
(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   1) dhi
+ (1 ↵i)
Z 1
0
(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ✏ j  j(1   j)K) dhi
= ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)↵ j   ↵i   ✏ j(1 ↵i)  j(1   j)K.
2.5 Value of Expertise & Perceptiveness
Substituting the equilibria listed in Theorems 2.4.7-2.4.12 and applying Lemmas 2.4.13 and
2.4.14, I compute player i’s value of expertise as
VoE!i ( i,↵i,   j,↵ j) = EU
!
i,EX( i,   j,↵ j)   EU!i,IX(↵i,   j,↵ j), (2.6)
where ! 2 {(P, IP), (P, IM), (P, EP), (P, EM), (M, P), (M,M)} represents the specific situation
in terms of the players’ expertise and perceptiveness. Each ordered pair in ! corresponds to a
viable situation for player i. For instance, (P, IP) corresponds to when i is perceptive and facing
an inexpert, perceptive opponent j. Similarly, (P, IM) corresponds to when i is perceptive and
facing an inexpert, imperceptive opponent j, (P, EP) corresponds to when i is perceptive and
facing an expert, perceptive opponent j, (P, EM) corresponds to when i is perceptive and facing
an expert, imperceptive opponent j, (M, P) corresponds to when i is imperceptive and facing
a perceptive opponent j, and (M,M) corresponds to when i is imperceptive and facing an
imperceptive opponent j. Figure 2.7 depicts i’s value of expertise in each of these situations
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for K 2 [1, 20].
Likewise, by substituting the equilibria listed in Theorems 2.4.7-2.4.12 and applying Lem-
mas 2.4.13 and 2.4.14, I compute player i’s value of perceptiveness as
VoP ⇢i (si,   j,↵ j)
= 12 [EU
⇢
i,x(si,   j|✏ j = 1) + EU
⇢
i,x(si,↵ j|✏ j = 0)]   EU
⇢
i,x(si,   j,↵ j|✏ j = 1/2), (2.7)
where ⇢ 2 {(E, P), (I, P), (E,M), (I,M)} represents the specific situation in terms of the players’
expertise and perceptiveness, x 2 {EX, IX} represents i’s expertise, and si 2 { i,↵i} represents
i’s equilibrium strategy.17 Each ordered pair in ⇢ corresponds to a viable situation for player
i. For instance, (E, P) corresponds to when i is expert and facing a perceptive opponent j.
Similarly, (I, P) corresponds to when i is inexpert and facing a perceptive opponent j, (E,M)
corresponds to when i is expert and facing an imperceptive opponent j, and (I,M) corresponds
to when i is inexpert and facing an imperceptive opponent j. Figure 2.8 depicts i’s value of
perceptiveness in each of these situations for K 2 [1, 20].
In Figure 2.7, each unique colour corresponds to a specific amount of information that i
has regarding j’s expertise. Also, the solid lines in Figure 2.7 represent the instance when i
is against a perceptive opponent j, whereas the dashed lines represent the instance when i is
against an imperceptive opponent j. Given these results, Figure 2.7 shows that the value of ex-
pertise is positive for all K 2 (1, 20]. This actually holds for all K > 20 as well. Furthermore,
as the players’ chip endowment increases, i’s value of expertise converges to 1 when both i
and j are perceptive and converges to 5/6 when i is imperceptive and j is perceptive. Contrar-
ily, as the players’ chip endowment increases, i’s value of expertise converges to 0 when j is
imperceptive.
The intuition for this is that, as the players’ chip endowment increases, each player i tends to
select fold with a weakly increasing frequency unless they are certain that j is inexpert. That is,
as K increases, i will select fold with a weakly increasing frequency unless i is perceptive and
17This notation assumes that si =  i if and only if x = EX.
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Figure 2.7: Player i’s value of expertise in various situations.
Figure 2.8: Player i’s value of perceptiveness in various situations.
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j is inexpert. In this case, as K increases, once the inexpert j switches from always choosing
all-in to choosing fold with some positive probability, the expert i will lower their cut-o↵ and
e↵ectively select all-in more frequently (as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.4). As the frequency
of an imperceptive opponent j choosing fold converges to 1, the expertise of player i matters
progressively less since hi becomes increasingly more irrelevant. Contrarily, when player i
is facing a perceptive opponent j, j will choose all-in with increasing probability beyond a
certain chip endowment threshold (as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.4) when i is inexpert, but
will continue choosing fold with increasing probability as K increases when i is expert. The
influence that i’s expertise has over j’s equilibrium strategy is what drives i’s value of expertise
when j is perceptive.
In Figure 2.8, the blue lines correspond to an expert i, while the yellow lines correspond
to an inexpert i. Furthermore, the solid lines correspond to an instance when j is perceptive,
while the dashed lines correspond to an instance when j is imperceptive. By Equation (2.7), an
expert i’s value of perceptiveness when j is perceptive is
VoP(E,P)i =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
37
392(K+
1
K 2) if K 2 [1, 1710+7
p
11
10 ]
K
4 +
3
8K   78  
(K 3)
8
p
K 4p
K
if K 2 ( 1710+7
p
11
10 ,
25/6]
K
8   78K   112 if K 2 (25/6, 2+
p
5]
5
12 +
p
K 4
4
p
K
  1K if K > 2+
p
5.
Furthermore, an expert i’s value of perceptiveness when j is imperceptive is
VoP(E,M)i =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
85
3528 (K+
1
K 2) if K 2 [1, 1710+7
p
11
10 ]
11K
144  518 (1  12K ) 
(K 2)
p
K 4
16
p
K
if K 2 (1710+7
p
11
10 ,
25
6 ]
1
72 (K 2+ 5K ) if K 2 (256 , 4+
p
17]
17
36 +
K 6
4
p
K(K 8)  
1
9 (K+
1
2K ) if K 2 (4+
p
17, 4+3
p
2]
1
18K +
1
4 +
K 10
4
p
K(K 8) if K > 4+3
p
2.
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Additionally, an inexpert i’s value of perceptiveness when j is perceptive is
VoP(I,P)i =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if K 2 [1, 2+
p
5]
1
8(K+
1
K )   12  
p
K 4
4
p
K
if K 2 (2+
p
5, 4+
p
17]
1
2  
p
K 4 
p
K 8
4
p
K
if K > 4+
p
17.
Lastly, an inexpert i’s value of perceptiveness when j is imperceptive is
VoP(I,M)i =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
4
441(K+
1
K 2) if K 2 [1, 1710+7
p
11
10 ]
1
4
q
K 4
K +
1
9 (K+
1
K )   1736 if K 2 ( 1710+7
p
11
10 ,
25
6 ]
1
9 (K 2)   1318K if K 2 ( 256 , 4+
p
17]
5
18  12pK(K 8) +
1
9 K   1318K if K 2 (4+
p
17, 4+3
p
2]
1
2[1   53K+ 1pK(K 8) ] if K > 4+3
p
2.
The main takeaway from Figure 2.7 is that the value of perceptiveness is generally positive
in all four situations. As the players’ chip endowment increases, i’s value of perceptiveness
converges to 2/3 when i is expert and j is perceptive. Otherwise, as the players’ chip endow-
ment increases, i’s value of perceptiveness converges to 1/2. Furthermore, for all K   1 when i
is expert, i’s value of perceptiveness is higher when j is perceptive than it is when j is imper-
ceptive. Contrarily, for all K   1 when i is inexpert, i’s value of perceptiveness is higher when
j is imperceptive than it is when j is perceptive.
The intuition for why perceptiveness generally provides positive value in all four situations
is similar to why expertise provides positive value for i when j is perceptive. Perceptiveness
allows a player i to identify, with certainty, a situation where j is inexpert. When i is perceptive
and j is inexpert, as the players’ chip endowment increases, i’s equilibrium strategy allows i
to select all-in with an increasing probability. Whereas, when i is imperceptive or when j is
expert, as the players’ chip endowment increases, i’s equilibrium strategy causes i to select fold
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with an increasing probability. To summarize this point, as K increases beyond a certain level,
when i is imperceptive, i will always fold more often; whereas, when i is perceptive, i will
fold more often when j is expert, but go all-in more often when j is inexpert. When i is in an
equilibrium that has i going all-in with a relatively high frequency compared to j, i is able to
realize value from winning the forced bets uncontested a higher proportion of the time. This is
similar to the benefit that an aggressive poker player experiences when facing a passive poker
player that tends to fold too often.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I develop and study a model that features six distinct information structures and
emulates a two-player, one-round game of poker. Player i is expert if they know the value of
their hand, hi, prior to deciding whether to go all-in or fold. Player i is perceptive if they know
whether their opponent j is expert. The six information structures I consider vary in terms of
the players’ expertise and perceptiveness.
The main result that I find in this chapter is that when the players’ chip endowment is su -
ciently high, perceptiveness always provides value. The intuition for this is that perceptiveness
allows a player to identify an inexpert opponent. This allows the player to e↵ectively utilize
an aggressive strategy to take advantage of their opponent’s inexpertise. Whereas, had the
player been imperceptive, the player would utilize a more passive equilibrium strategy, taking
into consideration that their opponent may actually be expert. The e↵ectively aggressive (all-
in with a high probability) strategy against an inexpert opponent allows the player to capture
the forced bets, uncontested, a high percentage of the time. Whereas, the passive (fold with
a high probability) strategy mitigates the player’s risk, but also causes the player to forgo the
opportunity of capturing any forced bets.
Chapter 3
Perceptiveness in a Market-Entry Game
3.1 Introduction
This chapter of my thesis studies the value and e↵ect that perceptiveness has in a market-entry
setting. A player is expert if they know their market-entry fee prior to making their market-
entry decision. Whereas, a player is perceptive if they know whether their opponent is expert.
Under an equilibrium refinement that treats the players as symmetrically as possible, I find that
the value of perceptiveness is always non-negative. Furthermore, the value of perceptiveness is
always zero for an inexpert agent whose opponent is perceptive. Also, when both players have
a su ciently high probability of being expert, the value of perceptiveness is positive; whereas,
if either player is inexpert with a su ciently high probability, the value of perceptiveness is
zero. Moreover, even when the value of perceptiveness is zero, perceptiveness can still a↵ect
the players’ equilibrium actions.
I also find that a player’s value of perceptiveness is minimized when their competitor enters
with a specific probability regardless of their expertise. As the di↵erence in the competitor’s
market-entry probability increases, with respect to their level of expertise, the player’s value of
perceptiveness increases. This is because perceptiveness allows the player to more accurately
gauge their competitor’s propensity to enter the market, which is what ultimately influences the
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player’s payo↵. When the competitor enters the market with a specific probability regardless of
their expertise, the value of knowing the competitor’s expertise is minimized since the player
can already infer the competitor’s probability of entering the market.
Studying perceptiveness in a market-entry setting is beneficial since doing so provides the-
oretical results that show whether perceptiveness has tangible value. My goal for this chapter is
to provide general insight towards determining when perceptiveness is beneficial in a market-
entry setting and how perceptiveness a↵ects the market-entry strategies of potential entrants.
Perceptiveness is directly linked to the information players have in games, so this chapter
is closely related to the value of information literature. This literature is vast, but still grow-
ing, with many influential papers1 along with new developments.2 Despite this, the notion of
studying a player’s information about their opponents’ information is quite novel. However, it
is becoming more prominent in recent years with the development of papers such as Mekonnen
and Leal Vizcaíno (2018), Denti (2019), and Tirole (2016).
Mekonnen and Leal Vizcaíno (2018) studies how information quality about an uncertain
state a↵ects the induced distribution of an agent’s optimal action. They primarily focus on a
single agent setting where the agent’s action and the payo↵-relevant state are complements, but
extend their results to supermodular games with incomplete information in order to understand
how information quality a↵ects the equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities.
They find that as one player’s information quality increases, the other player is indirectly more
informed about the former player’s signal. Mekonnen and Leal Vizcaíno (2018) also investi-
gates a two-player Bayesian game with one-sided information acquisition of a payo↵-relevant
state. They find that a player’s value of acquiring information is always positive when their
opponent does not know that they acquired such. However, they also find that a player’s value
of information acquisition may be negative if their opponent knows such information was ac-
quired. My research departs from Mekonnen and Leal Vizcaíno (2018) since I investigate a
market-entry game with strategic substitutes. I also allow for informational symmetry and fo-
1Such as Hirshleifer (1971), Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Vives (1984).
2For instance Myatt and Wallace (2015), Pęski (2008), and Ui and Yoshizawa (2015).
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cus my e↵orts toward determining when perceptiveness provides value and the e↵ect that such
information has on the players’ equilibrium strategies.
Denti (2019) examines a model of endogenous information acquisition in coordination
games where players can choose how much information to acquire, where such information
pertains to what the other players know about the value of a common payo↵-relevant state.
Tirole (2016) considers a framework where players can choose their information structure, and
subsequently play a game that contains linear-quadratic payo↵s and binary information struc-
tures using the information structure chosen by the agent. The key distinction between my
research and that of Denti (2019) and Tirole (2016) is that I study the value of information
regarding another player’s information in a market-entry game. I also focus my attention on
how such information influences the outcome of a market-entry game, whereas both of these
papers study how much information should be acquired in their respective settings.
This chapter also relates to market-entry literature. To the best of my knowledge, my re-
search is the first to investigate the value and e↵ect that a player’s information regarding another
player’s information about a payo↵-relevant state has in a market-entry setting. Market-entry
literature includes papers that have used experiments to study how to determine which of the
multiple equilibria that exist in market-entry games agents are likely to coordinate upon,3 as
well as papers that have conducted market-entry empirical studies.4 I contribute to this lit-
erature by providing theoretical results which indicate that a player’s information regarding
another player’s information of a payo↵-relevant state should be considered when modeling a
market-entry game.
The rest of this chapter is comprised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model and the in-
formation structures I consider. Section 3.3 develops the strategies, best responses, equilibria,
and expected payo↵s used to compute the value and e↵ect of perceptiveness. Section 3.4 de-
rives the value of perceptiveness and discusses key insights. Section 3.5 concludes. Appendix
B provides all supplemental appendices for this chapter.
3Including Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Du↵y and Hopkins (2005), and Erev and Rapoport (1998).
4Including Berry and Tamer (2006), and Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991).
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3.2 Model
Players, Actions, States
I study a Bayesian game that features two players, A and B, that each produce the same product.
Both players must consider whether to “enter” (ai = E) or “not enter” (ai = N) the market in
which this product is sold. Player i’s payo↵ function is5
ui(ai, aj,  i) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if ai = N
1    i if (ai, aj) = (E,N)
⇡D    i if (ai, aj) = (E, E).
I let  i ⇠ i.i.d. U[0,1] and ⇡D 2 [0,1/2], where  i represents the market entry fee, and ⇡D
represents a duopolist’s post-entry profit. In this chapter, I normalize a monopolist’s post-entry
profit to equal 1.
Microfoundations
I consider a linear inverse demand curve and a situation such that each player can produce
with a marginal cost of zero. Furthermore, I assume that the players’ products are identically-
perceived by consumers. Bertrand competition arises when ⇡D = 0, since under Bertrand com-
petition both players would continually undercut the other player’s price. Cournot competition
arises when ⇡D = 4/9.6
Types
In this chapter, I consider a continuum of information structures. Similar to the last chapter,
I construct the Bayesian Nash equilibria and expected payo↵s for each information structure,
then use the results to determine the value and e↵ect of perceptiveness. The parameter space
5 j will always denote i’s opponent.
6A derivation showing that Cournot competition arises when ⇡D = 4/9 is shown in Appendix B.1.
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for the information structures I consider is (✏A, ✏B) 2 [0,1]2, where ✏i represents the probabil-
ity of player i knowing the value of  i. Each (✏A, ✏B) ordered pair corresponds to a specific
information structure. Furthermore, (✏A, ✏B) is common knowledge to both players.
Definition 3.2.1 Player i is perceptive if player i knows with certainty whether player j knows
the value of   j.
By Defintion 3.2.1, player i is perceptive if and only if ✏ j 2 {0,1}. Otherwise, player i is
imperceptive. Since (✏A, ✏B) is common knowledge, each player’s perceptiveness is common
knowledge as well.
Definition 3.2.2 Player i is expert if player i knows  i prior to making their market-entry
decision.
Definition 3.2.2 classifies player i as expert, in this chapter, if and only if i knows the value
of  i prior to deciding whether to enter the market. If player i does not know  i prior to making
such decision, I classify i as being inexpert.
The type space, ti, for each player i depends on their opponent’s perceptiveness. If ✏i = 1,
player j is perceptive, and i’s type space is [0,1] since i is expert. If ✏i = 0, player j is perceptive,
and i’s type space is {Ii} since i is inexpert. If ✏i 2 (0,1), player j is imperceptive, and i’s type
space is [0,1] [ {Ii} since i may be expert or inexpert.
Timeline
The timeline for the game in this chapter is as follows. First, each player i observes (✏A, ✏B)
and learns whether they are expert or inexpert. Second, each player i receives their draw of
 i, which player i observes if i is expert. Third, both players simultaneously decide whether to
enter the market. Fourth, payo↵s are realized.
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3.3 Strategies, Best Responses & Equilibria
Player Strategies
Similar to the last chapter, an expert agent i knows the value of  i. This should a↵ect an expert
i’s strategy since i’s expected payo↵ depends on  i. Since i’s expected payo↵ is decreasing
in  i, I restrict attention to cut-o↵ strategies for an expert agent i. I let  i, where  i 2 [0,1],
represent an expert agent i’s cut-o↵, such that i chooses to enter for all  i   i and chooses to
not enter for all  i >  i.7
An inexpert agent i does not know the value of  i prior to making their market-entry deci-
sion. Thus, an inexpert i’s expected payo↵ does not depend on  i. I henceforth define ⌘i, such
that ⌘i 2 [0,1], as the probability that an inexpert agent i chooses “enter”. Thus, an inexpert
agent i chooses “not enter” with probability 1 ⌘i.
Best Responses
I obtain the best response for an expert agent i by finding the value of  i that makes i indi↵erent
between entering and not entering the market. The payo↵ i receives from not entering is zero
regardless of  i. Contrarily, the payo↵ i receives from entering is a probability distribution over
j’s potential expertise and corresponding strategies, multiplied by the payo↵ i would receive
given j’s action. More specifically, an expert i’s payo↵ from entering the market is
uEi,EX(  j, ⌘ j) = ✏ j[  j(⇡D  i) + (1   j)(1  i)] + (1 ✏ j)[⌘ j(⇡D  i) + (1 ⌘ j)(1  i)]
= 1    i   (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j). (3.1)
An expert i is indi↵erent between entering and not entering the market when  i =  i. Hence,
I obtain an expert i’s best response function by equating i’s payo↵ from entering the market to
i’s payo↵ from not entering the market, while setting  i =  i. As a result, an expert i’s best
response function is
7I restrict attention to equilibria where an expert i chooses enter if they are indi↵erent between the two actions.
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 BRi (  j, ⌘ j) = 1   (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j). (3.2)
I obtain the best response function for an inexpert agent i by determining when each of i’s
actions result in a higher expected payo↵ than i’s other action. An inexpert i’s expected payo↵
from not entering the market is zero. Whereas, an inexpert i’s expected payo↵ from entering
the market is
E[uEi,IX(  j, ⌘ j)] = ✏ j[  j(⇡D E[ i]) + (1   j)(1 E[ i])]
+ (1 ✏ j)[⌘ j(⇡D E[ i]) + (1 ⌘ j)(1 E[ i])]
= 1   E[ i]   (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j). (3.3)
I obtain an inexpert i’s best response correspondence by comparing i’s expected payo↵ for each
action and simplifying.8 Therefore, an inexpert i’s best response correspondence is
⌘BRi (  j, ⌘ j) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
{1} if ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j < 12(1 ⇡D)
{0} if ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j > 12(1 ⇡D)
[0,1] if ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j = 12(1 ⇡D) .
(3.4)
The expression ✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j represents j’s aggregate probability of entering the market.
Consequently, i will be less (more) inclined to enter the market as j’s aggregate probability of
entering increases (decreases). As j enters the market with a higher probability, the incentive
for i entering lessens since the probability of realizing the duopoly profit, as opposed to the
monopoly profit, increases. Furthermore, the best responses illustrate that as a duopolist’s
post-entry profit increases, both players should be equally or more inclined to enter the market,
given their opponent’s aggregate probability of entering remains constant.
8Since  i ⇠ i.i.d. U[0,1], E[ i] = 1/2.
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Equilibria
I use the Bayesian Nash solution concept to solve my model. By applying the best responses
depicted by Expressions (3.2) and (3.4), I develop Propositions 3.3.1-3.3.6.
Proposition 3.3.1 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (0,0). (⌘⇤A, ⌘⇤B) is an equilibrium if and only if for all
i 2 {A,B}
⌘⇤i = 1 if ⌘
⇤
j <
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.5a)
and ⌘⇤i = 0 if ⌘
⇤
j >
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.5b)
where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
Proposition 3.3.2 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) 2 {(0,1), (1,0)}. (⌘⇤i ,  ⇤j) is an equilibrium if and only if for
all i 2 {A,B}
 ⇤j = 1   (1 ⇡D)⌘⇤i , (3.6)
⌘⇤i = 1 if  
⇤
j <
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.7a)
and ⌘⇤i = 0 if  
⇤
j >
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.7b)
where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
Proposition 3.3.3 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1). ( ⇤A,  ⇤B) is an equilibrium if and only if for all
i 2 {A,B}
 ⇤i = 1   (1 ⇡D) ⇤j, (3.8)
where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
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Proposition 3.3.4 Suppose ✏i = 0 and ✏ j 2 (0,1), for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such that
i , j. (⌘⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) is an equilibrium if and only if for all i 2 {A,B}
⌘⇤i = 1 if ✏ j 
⇤
j + (1 ✏ j)⌘⇤j < 12(1 ⇡D) , (3.9a)
⌘⇤i = 0 if ✏ j 
⇤
j + (1 ✏ j)⌘⇤j > 12(1 ⇡D) , (3.9b)
 ⇤j = 1   (1 ⇡D)⌘⇤i , (3.10)
⌘⇤j = 1 if ⌘
⇤
i <
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.11a)
and ⌘⇤j = 0 if ⌘
⇤
i >
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.11b)
where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
Proposition 3.3.5 Suppose ✏i = 1 and ✏ j 2 (0,1), for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such that
i , j. ( ⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) is an equilibrium if and only if for all i 2 {A,B}
 ⇤i = 1   (1 ⇡D)(✏ j ⇤j + (1 ✏ j)⌘⇤j), (3.12)
 ⇤j = 1   (1 ⇡D) ⇤i , (3.13)
⌘⇤j = 1 if  
⇤
i <
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.14a)
and ⌘⇤j = 0 if  
⇤
i >
1
2(1 ⇡D) , (3.14b)
where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
Proposition 3.3.6 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) 2 (0,1)2. ( ⇤A, ⌘⇤A,  ⇤B, ⌘⇤B) is an equilibrium if and only if for
all i 2 {A,B}
 ⇤i = 1   (1 ⇡D)(✏ j ⇤j + (1 ✏ j)⌘⇤j), (3.15)
⌘⇤i = 1 if ✏ j 
⇤
j + (1 ✏ j)⌘⇤j < 12(1 ⇡D) , (3.16a)
and ⌘⇤i = 0 if ✏ j 
⇤
j + (1 ✏ j)⌘⇤j > 12(1 ⇡D) , (3.16b)
where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
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The proof of Propositions 3.3.1-3.3.6 follows from the definition of a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium and the best response derivations I completed earlier in Section 3.3. I find all Bayesian
Nash equilibria by using Propositions 3.3.1-3.3.6 and solving the resulting system of equations.
Theorem 3.3.7 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (0,0). (⌘⇤A, ⌘⇤B) 2 {( 12(1 ⇡D) ,
1
2(1 ⇡D) ), (0,1), (1,0)} is an equilib-
rium. Furthermore, if ⇡D = 1/2, then (⌘⇤i , ⌘
⇤
j) = (1, ⌘̄ j) such that ⌘̄ j 2 [0,1) is an equilibrium as
well, for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
Proof Theorem 3.3.7 follows directly from Proposition 3.3.1.
Theorem 3.3.8 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) 2 {(0,1), (1,0)}. (⌘⇤i ,  ⇤j) 2 {( 1 2⇡D2(1 ⇡D)2 ,
1
2(1 ⇡D) ), (0,1), (1, ⇡D)} is
an equilibrium for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j.
Proof Theorem 3.3.8 follows directly from Proposition 3.3.2.
Theorem 3.3.9 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1,1). ( ⇤A,  ⇤B) = (
1
2 ⇡D ,
1
2 ⇡D ) is an equilibrium.
Proof Theorem 3.3.9 follows directly from Proposition 3.3.3.
Theorem 3.3.10 Suppose ✏i = 0 and ✏ j 2 (0,1), for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such that
i , j. (⌘⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) 2 {(0,1,1), (1, ⇡D, 0)} is an equilibrium. Furthermore, if ✏B > 1  ⇡D1 ⇡D , then
(⌘⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) = (
1 2⇡D
2✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 1 
1 2⇡D
2✏B(1 ⇡D) , 1) is an equilibrium. Additionally, if ✏B  1 
⇡D
1 ⇡D , then
(⌘⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) = (
1
2(1 ⇡D) ,
1/2, 12+
⇡D
2(1 ✏B)(1 ⇡D) ) is an equilibrium. Lastly, if ⇡D =
1/2, then (⌘⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) =
(1, ⇡D, ⌘̄ j) such that ⌘̄ j 2 [0,1] is an equilibrium as well.
Proof Theorem 3.3.10 follows directly from Proposition 3.3.4.
Theorem 3.3.11 Suppose ✏i = 1 and ✏ j 2 (0,1), for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such
that i , j. ( ⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) = (
⇡D
1 ✏ j(1 ⇡D)2 , 1 
⇡D(1 ⇡D)
1 ✏ j(1 ⇡D)2 , 1) is an equilibrium. Additionally, if ✏ j 
1   ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, then ( ⇤i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) 2 {(
1 (1 ⇡D)✏ j
1 ✏ j(1 ⇡D)2 ,
⇡D
1 ✏ j(1 ⇡D)2 , 0), (
1
2(1 ⇡D) ,
1
2 ,
1
2 
⇡2D
2(1 ✏ j)(1 ⇡D)2 )} is an equi-
librium as well.
Proof Theorem 3.3.11 follows directly from Proposition 3.3.5.
44 Chapter 3. Perceptiveness in aMarket-Entry Game
Theorem 3.3.12 Suppose (✏A, ✏B) 2 (0,1)2.
( ⇤A, ⌘
⇤
A,  
⇤
B, ⌘
⇤
B) = (1  (1 ⇡D)(1 ✏B(1 ⇡D))1 ✏A✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 1, 1 
(1 ⇡D)(1 ✏A(1 ⇡D))
1 ✏A✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 1)
is an equilibrium if and only if 1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2  (2 ✏i)✏ j, for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such
that i , j. Furthermore,
( ⇤A, ⌘
⇤
A,  
⇤
B, ⌘
⇤
B) 2 {(1  ✏B⇡D(1 ⇡D)1 ✏A✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 1,
⇡D
1 ✏A✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 0), (
⇡D
1 ✏A✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 0, 1 
✏A⇡D(1 ⇡D)
1 ✏A✏B(1 ⇡D)2 , 1)}
is an equilibrium if and only if ✏A✏B  1   ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2. Additionally,
( ⇤i , ⌘
⇤
i ,  
⇤
j, ⌘
⇤
j) = (1  1 2⇡D2✏i(1 ⇡D) , 1, 1/2,
1 2⇡D ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2
2✏i(1 ✏ j)(1 ⇡D)2 )
is an equilibrium, for all i 2 {A,B} where j 2 {A,B} is such that i , j, if and only if
✏i✏ j  1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2,
✏i   1  ⇡D1 ⇡D
and ✏i(2 ✏ j)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2.
Lastly,
( ⇤A, ⌘
⇤
A,  
⇤
B, ⌘
⇤
B) = (1/2,
1
2+
⇡D
2(1 ⇡D)(1 ✏A) ,
1/2, 12+
⇡D
2(1 ⇡D)(1 ✏B) )
is an equilibrium if and only if ✏A  1  ⇡D1 ⇡D and ✏B  1 
⇡D
1 ⇡D .
Proof Theorem 3.3.12 follows directly from Proposition 3.3.6.
Figures 3.1-3.5 depict the equilibrium existence regions when ⇡D = 4/9 and (✏A, ✏B) 2 (0,1)2.
Corollary 3.3.13 formalizes equilibrium existence for all (✏A, ✏B) 2 [0,1]2.
Corollary 3.3.13 There exists an equilibrium for all (✏A, ✏B) 2 [0,1]2.
Proof Corollary 3.3.13 follows directly from Theorems 3.3.7-3.3.12.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium existence when both inexpert agents always enter.
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium existence when one inexpert agent always enters, whereas the other
inexpert agent never enters.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium existence when inexpert agent A always enters, whereas inexpert agent
B mixes between entering and not entering.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium existence when inexpert agent B always enters, whereas inexpert agent
A mixes between entering and not entering.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium existence when both inexpert agents mix between entering and not
entering.
Equilibrium Refinement
As illustrated by Figures 3.1-3.5 and Theorems 3.3.7-3.3.12, multiple equilibria exist for many
(✏A, ✏B) information structures. Because of this, I refine the equilibria when multiple exist.
The equilibrium selection rule I follow can be thought of as the “middle equilibrium”. For
all (✏A, ✏B) 2 [0,1]2, the equilibria that exist can be ranked in terms of each player’s aggregate
entry probability. As shown by expressions (3.2) and (3.4), i’s best response is decreasing in j’s
aggregate entry probability. Hence, i’s rank of equilibria in terms of aggregate entry probability
will be the reverse of j’s rank.
The “middle equilibrium” selection rule selects a symmetric equilibrium when ✏A = ✏B,
whereas it treats the players as symmetrically as possible, in terms of aggregate entry probabil-
ity, when ✏A , ✏B. For this rule to work nicely, there must be an odd number of equilibria that
exist for any (✏A, ✏B) coordinate. This property holds generically for my model.
Based on the middle equilibrium selection rule and the aggregate entry probability rank-
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ings, the refined equilibrium can be segmented into four regions on the ✏A-✏B plane. The four
regions are as follows. First, if ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, then an equi-
librium where any inexpert agent always enters arises. Second, if ✏A  1  ⇡D1 ⇡D and ✏B  1 
⇡D
1 ⇡D ,
then an equilibrium where any inexpert agent mixes between entering and not entering the
market arises. Third, if ✏A   1  ⇡D1 ⇡D and ✏B(2 ✏A) < 1 (
⇡D
1 ⇡D )
2, then an equilibrium where any
inexpert agent for A always enters, whereas any inexpert agent for B mixes between entering
and not entering the market arises. Fourth, if ✏B   1  ⇡D1 ⇡D and ✏A(2 ✏B) < 1 (
⇡D
1 ⇡D )
2, then an
equilibrium where any inexpert agent for B always enters, whereas any inexpert agent for A
mixes between entering and not entering the market arises. Figure 3.6 gives an image of the
refined equilibrium regions and how they adjust for di↵erent values of ⇡D.
Ex-Ante Expected Payo↵s
In order to determine a player’s value of perceptiveness, I must derive a player’s ex-ante ex-
pected payo↵ given such player’s expertise. I focus attention towards expectations given exper-
tise since a player’s market-entry decision is made after the player has observed their expertise.
I obtain i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ functions by integrating over all of i’s possible draws of
 i with respect to i’s optimal action for each specific draw. An expert agent i’s ex-ante expected
payo↵ is
EUEXi (  j, ⌘ j) =
Z  i
0
uEi,EX(  j, ⌘ j)d i +
Z 1
 i
uNi,EX(  j, ⌘ j)d i
=
Z  i
0
[1  i (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j+(1 ✏ j)⌘ j)]d i +
Z 1
 i
[0]d i
=  i(1 (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j+(1 ✏ j)⌘ j) 12 i)
=  i( BRi (  j, ⌘ j) 12 i). (3.17)
If an expert agent i plays a best response strategy, then Equation (3.17) can be rewritten as
EUEXi (  j, ⌘ j) =
1
2 ( 
BR
i (  j, ⌘ j))
2. (3.18)
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(a) Refined equilibrium when ⇡D = 0. (b) Refined equilibrium when ⇡D = 2/9.
(c) Refined equilibrium when ⇡D = 4/9 . (d) Refined equilibrium when ⇡D = 1/2.
Figure 3.6: Refined equilibrium regions for various levels of ⇡D.
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Moreover, an inexpert agent i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is
EUIXi (  j, ⌘ j) = ⌘i
Z 1
0
E[uEi,IX(  j, ⌘ j)]d i + (1 ⌘i)
Z 1
0
uNi,IX(  j, ⌘ j)d i
= ⌘i
Z 1
0
[1 E[ i] (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j+(1 ✏ j)⌘ j)]d i + (1 ⌘i)
Z 1
0
[0]d i
= ⌘i( 12 (1 ⇡D)(✏ j  j+(1 ✏ j)⌘ j)). (3.19)
Equation (3.18) shows that an expert agent’s ex-ante expected payo↵ strictly increases in
their best response cuto↵. This implies that any equilibrium where an expert agent i enters the
market with a higher cuto↵ than in some other equilibrium, will have a higher ex-ante expected
payo↵ for i than the other equilibrium had.
Equations (3.2), (3.18), and (3.19) together show that regardless of i’s expertise, i’s ex-ante
expected payo↵ is weakly decreasing in j’s aggregate entry probability. This implies that any
player, regardless of their expertise, that is using a best response, is weakly better o↵ by their
competitor entering the market less frequently. An interesting insight that arises from this is
that if a player could perform an action that somehow deters (or at least makes deterrence more
likely) their opponent from entering the market, the player would strictly benefit from doing so
if they enter the market with positive probability. Therefore, there is tangible value in deterring
a competitor’s entry into the market.
3.4 Value of Perceptiveness
Identifying the value of perceptiveness using the ex-ante expected payo↵s when i is perceptive
(✏ j 2 {0,1}) and when i is most imperceptive (✏ j = 1/2) is problematic in this chapter since
multiple equilibria exist and the existence regions vary across the ✏i-✏ j plane. Moreover, these
existence regions change as the duopoly profit changes. Also, there is no combination of
equilibria that connects the existence regions across the ✏i-✏ j plane uniformly.9 Therefore, in
9To clarify, by saying that “there is no combination of equilibria that connects. . . uniformly”, I mean that across
the entire ✏i-✏ j plane, there is at least one equilibrium region boundary that will not be continuous, in terms of the
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order to obtain an accurate gauge of the value of perceptiveness, I must restrict my focus to
analyzing its value within specific equilibrium regions.
I determine i’s value of perceptiveness by taking the di↵erence between i’s expected payo↵
with information pertaining to j’s expertise and i’s expected payo↵ without such information.
Hence, the value of perceptiveness for a player i with expertise x, such that x 2 {EX, IX}, is
given by
VoPxi (✏i, ✏ j, µ) =
1
2 [EU
x
i (✏i, ✏ j+µ) + EU
x
i (✏i, ✏ j µ)]   EUxi (✏i, ✏ j), (3.20)
where µ is some arbitrary positive number such that [✏ j µ, ✏ j+µ] ⇢ [LBregion,UBregion].10
Plotting ✏ j on the x-axis and EUxi (✏i, ✏ j) on the y-axis, VoP
x
i (✏i, ✏ j, µ) can be interpreted as
the vertical distance between the weighted average of i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ using ✏̄ j = ✏ j+
µ and ✏ j = ✏ j   µ, and i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ using ✏ j. The weighted average of i’s ex-ante
expected payo↵, using ✏ j and ✏̄ j, provides a notion to compare mean-preserving spreads of the
same player. Computing the vertical distance identifies how much i values being at a weighted-
average of two di↵erent ✏ j points, at least one of which results in i being more perceptive,11 as
opposed to a middling ✏ j point. Switching from ✏ j with certainty to a weighted-average of ✏ j
and ✏̄ j could hypothetically occur if i were granted some additional information regarding j’s
expertise. Conditional on the weighted-average of ✏ j and ✏̄ j being a mean-preserving spread
of ✏ j, the vertical distance between the resulting ex-ante expected payo↵s captures i’s value of
perceptiveness. In Appendix B.2, I include an example that illustrates the intuition behind how
I measure the value of perceptiveness, as well as why this method is credible.
By taking the second derivative of i’s ex-ante expected payo↵s with respect to ✏ j, I am able
to determine whether the value of perceptiveness is positive, zero, or negative. If the second
derivative of i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ with respect to ✏ j is strictly greater (less) than zero, i’s
players’ equilibrium strategies, as either ✏i or ✏ j changes.
10LBregion and UBregion represent the lower and upper ✏ j bounds for the specific equilibrium existence region
being considered.
11As shown by Reza (1994), uncertainty is maximized when all potential outcomes occur with equal probability.
Hence, the most imperceptive player i can be occurs when ✏ j = 1/2. Consequently, i becomes more perceptive as
|✏ j   12 | becomes larger. From here it is easy to show that for all valid ✏ j and µ combinations, at least one of ✏ j and
✏̄ j results in i being more perceptive than i is with ✏ j.
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value of perceptiveness is positive (negative). If the second derivative of i’s ex-ante expected
payo↵ with respect to ✏ j equals zero, i’s value of perceptiveness is zero. This follows from the
properties of second derivatives, convexity, and concavity.
To determine the magnitude of i’s value of perceptiveness, di↵erent values of µ can be
applied within Equation (3.20). This allows me to determine the resulting vertical distance,
which captures i’s value of perceptiveness, for the specific value of µ that I consider. Whether
searching for the sign or magnitude of i’s value of perceptiveness, it is imperative that I use
mean-preserving spreads of ✏ j in equation (3.20). Doing so allows for a direct comparison to
be made between two di↵erent levels of perceptiveness for player i.
3.4.1 Application to Market-Entry Setting
Being perceptive for i can be thought of as having information pertaining to j’s expertise.
As such, the steps for determining the value of perceptiveness are similar to those taken to
determine the value of information in the oil investment decision problem outlined in Appendix
B.2, where p is now the ex-ante probability of j being expert (✏ j) and the expected profit is now
i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ (EUxi (✏i, ✏ j)).
Without loss of generality, in this section I restrict attention to the (✏i, ✏ j) 2 (0,1)2 informa-
tion structures. By substituting the refined “middle equilibria” listed in Theorem 3.3.12 into the
ex-ante expected payo↵ equations, (3.18) and (3.19), I determine the ex-ante expected payo↵s
for the refined equilibria. If ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2,
EUEXi (✏i,✏ j) =
1
2 (1 
(1 ⇡D)(1 ✏ j(1 ⇡D))
1 ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2 )
2.
and EUIXi (✏i,✏ j) =
✏ j(2 ✏i)(1 ⇡D)2 (1 2⇡D)
2(1 ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2) .
If ✏i  1  ⇡D1 ⇡D for i 2 {A,B},
EUEXi (✏i,✏ j) = 1/8.
and EUIXi (✏i,✏ j) = 0.
If ✏i   1  ⇡D1 ⇡D and ✏ j(2 ✏i) < 1 (
⇡D
1 ⇡D )
2 for i 2 {A,B},
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EUEXi (✏i,✏ j) =
1
2 (1 
1 2⇡D
2✏i(1 ⇡D) )
2,
EUIXi (✏i,✏ j) =
1
2 
1 2⇡D
2✏i(1 ⇡D) ,
EUEXj (✏i,✏ j) = 1/8,
and EUIXj (✏i,✏ j) = 0.
When either ✏A(2 ✏B) < 1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 or ✏B(2 ✏A) < 1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, perceptiveness has zero value
for player i regardless of i’s expertise since EUxi (✏i,✏ j) is linear with respect to ✏ j for x 2
{EX,IX} and i 2 {A,B}. However, if ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, and i is
expert,
dEUEXi (✏i,✏ j)
d✏ j
=
(1   ✏i(1 ⇡D))(⇡D + ✏ j(1 ✏i)(1 ⇡D)2)(1 ⇡D)2
(1   ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2)3
and
d2EUEXi (✏i,✏ j)
d✏ j2
=
(1   ✏i(1 ⇡D))(1   ✏i + ✏i(3⇡D + 2✏ j(1 ✏i)(1 ⇡D)2))(1 ⇡D)4
(1   ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2)4
; (3.21)
whereas, if ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, and i is inexpert,
dEUIXi (✏i,✏ j)
d✏ j
=
(1 ✏i(1 ⇡D))(1 ⇡D)2
(1 ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2)2
and
d2EUIXi (✏i,✏ j)
d✏ j2
=
2✏i(1 ✏i(1 ⇡D))(1 ⇡D)4
(1 ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2)3
. (3.22)
Suppose ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2. Equations (3.21) and (3.22)
depict the convexity of i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ functions, with respect to ✏ j, for expert and
inexpert agents of i respectively. These equations show that perceptiveness has positive value
for i given that ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, since d
2EUEXi (✏i,✏ j,⇡D)
d✏ j2
> 0 and
d2EUIXi (✏i,✏ j,⇡D)
d✏ j2
> 0. This implies that both ex-ante expected payo↵ functions are convex in ✏ j.
Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, as well as Corollary 3.4.3, formalize these results.
Theorem 3.4.1 Suppose i is expert. Under the “middle equilibrium” refinement, i’s value of
perceptiveness is positive if and only if
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i) ✏i(2 ✏ j)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2,
ii) ✏ j(2 ✏i)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2,
and iii) (⇡D, ✏i) , (0,1).
Otherwise, i’s value of perceptiveness is zero.
Theorem 3.4.2 Suppose i is inexpert. Under the “middle equilibrium” refinement, i’s value of
perceptiveness is positive if and only if
i) ✏i(2 ✏ j)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2,
ii) ✏ j(2 ✏i)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2,
and iii) ✏i , 0.
Otherwise, i’s value of perceptiveness is zero.
Corollary 3.4.3 Under the “middle equilibrium” refinement, i’s value of perceptiveness is
never negative.
The proof for Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 follow from the preceding discussion combined
with determining when the second derivatives, depicted in Equations (3.21) and (3.22), equal
zero.12 Corollary 3.4.3 can be established by showing that there is no (✏A, ✏B) ordered pair that
results in i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ being strictly concave in ✏ j under the “middle equilib-
rium” refinement. As it turns out, the non-negativity property listed in Corollary 3.4.3 does not
hold in general. The value of perceptiveness for i can actually be negative if a change in i’s
perceptiveness causes the equilibrium to shift from an equilibrium where i enters frequently to
one where i enters rarely.13 However, under the “middle equilibrium” selection rule, i’s value
of perceptiveness is either positive or zero.
12Thereby indicating when, in the corresponding equilibrium region, the value of perceptiveness is zero.
13Recall that i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is weakly increasing in their probability of entering the market. Hence,
if an increase in i’s perceptiveness causes the equilibrium to shift in a way that i’s market-entry frequency su -
ciently decreases, i’s value of perceptiveness will be negative.
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Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 establish whether i’s value of perceptiveness is positive, zero, or
negative within each equilibrium region. Based on these theorems, given the “middle equi-
librium” refinement, the only equilibrium region where the value of perceptiveness may di↵er
from zero is the region where ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏B(2 ✏A)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2.
Theorem 3.4.4 Suppose ✏i(2 ✏ j)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏ j(2 ✏i)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2. An expert i’s value of
perceptiveness is
VoPEXi (✏i, ✏ j, µ) =
( f k + gh)2 + ( f h + gk)2
2(k2   h2)2  
f 2
2k2
; (3.23)
whereas, an inexpert i’s value of perceptiveness is
VoPIXi (✏i, ✏ j, µ) =
lh
k(k2   h2) , (3.24)
such that
k = 1   ✏i✏ j(1 ⇡D)2,
f = ⇡D + (1 ✏i)✏ j(1 ⇡D)2,
g = (1 ✏i)(1 ⇡D)2µ,
h = ✏i(1 ⇡D)2µ,
and l = (1 ✏i(1 ⇡D))(1 ⇡D)2µ.
Theorem 3.4.4 summarizes the magnitude of i’s value of perceptiveness when such value
is non-zero under the “middle equilibrium” refinement. The proof of Theorem 3.4.4 follows
from substituting i’s ex-ante expected payo↵s, when ✏A(2 ✏B)   1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2 and ✏B(2 ✏A)  
1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2, into Equation (3.20). Equation (3.24) shows that when i is inexpert and j is per-
ceptive, i’s value of perceptiveness is always zero (since ✏i = 0). Furthermore, an inexpert
agent i’s value of perceptiveness is positive when j is imperceptive, ✏i 2 (0,1). Also, for both
levels of expertise, the magnitude of i’s value of perceptiveness increases as the quality of such
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information (µ) increases.
Corollary 3.4.5 Suppose (✏i,✏ j) 2 (0,1)2 and   j = ⌘ j, for all i 2 {A,B}, where j 2 {A,B} such
that i , j. Player i’s value of perceptiveness is zero. Moreover, perceptiveness will not e↵ect
i’s equilibrium strategy.
Proof See Appendix B.3.
The intuition for Corollary 3.4.5 comes from each player knowing that their opponent will
enter the market with a particular probability regardless of their expertise. As shown by Equa-
tions (3.2), (3.4), (3.17), and (3.19), each agent i’s best response and ex-ante expected pay-
o↵, with respect j’s equilibrium strategies, depends solely on j’s aggregate entry probability,
✏ j  j + (1 ✏ j)⌘ j. Given that j enters the market with the same probability regardless of j’s ex-
pertise, i’s best response and ex-ante expected payo↵ will be independent of i’s perceptiveness
since ✏ j drops out of Equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.17), and (3.19), when substituting in   j = ⌘ j.
Therefore, when j enters the market with a specific probability regardless of j’s expertise, i’s
value of perceptiveness will be zero and perceptiveness will not a↵ect i’s equilibrium strat-
egy. Moreover, given the “middle equilibrium” refinement, under Bertrand competition (when
⇡D = 0), when (✏A,✏B) 2 (0,1)2, player i will enter the market with a probability of 1/2 regard-
less of i’s expertise, for all i 2 {A,B}. That is, an expert agent i will use a cut-o↵ strategy of
 i = 1/2, whereas an inexpert agent i will use a mixing strategy of ⌘i = 1/2.14 This implies that
perceptiveness will not have any value or e↵ect to players under Bertrand competition.
3.4.2 Comparing Results Between Chapters 2 & 3
Comparing the results between Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 can be done by fixing ✏i, such that
✏i 2 {0, 1/2, 1}, while varying ✏ j, then applying i’s expected payo↵s to Equation (3.20) in order
to obtain i’s value of perceptiveness. In Chapter 2, I obtain i’s value of perceptiveness using
µ = 1/2. Whereas, in Chapter 3, I must consider the bounds of the equilibrium region of
14This result can be obtained by substituting ⇡D = 0 into Theorem 3.3.12.
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interest. Hence, there will be an upper bound for the µ-value I consider in Chapter 3. For
the following comparison, I set ⇡D = 4/9. Based on the equilibrium region bounds in Chapter
3, when (✏i, ✏ j) = (0,1/2), I can consider µ 2 [0,3/10]; when (✏i, ✏ j) = (1/2,1/2), I can consider
µ 2 [0,13/50]; and when (✏i, ✏ j) = (1,1/2), I can consider µ 2 [0,7/50].15 Figures 3.7-3.10 present
agent i’s value of perceptiveness for the aforementioned parameter values and (✏i, ✏ j) ordered
pairs. Figures 3.7 and 3.9 correspond to my results in Chapter 2, whereas Figures 3.8 and 3.10
correspond to my results in Chapter 3.
As illustrated by Figures 3.7-3.10, perceptiveness generally provides positive value to play-
ers in both models. However, the magnitude of benefit that arises from perceptiveness varies
substantially between the models. Figures 3.7-3.10 show that perceptiveness has a more sub-
stantial benefit in Chapter 2 than it has in Chapter 3. The value of perceptiveness in Chapter 2
(Figures 3.7 and 3.9) is measured in terms of chips (K); whereas, the value of perceptiveness in
Chapter 3 (Figures 3.8 and 3.10) is measured in terms of monopolistic profit (⇡M = 1). For in-
stance, suppose (✏i, ✏ j) = (1/2,1/2) and K = 18 in the Chapter 2 model, while (⇡D, µ) = (4/9,1/5) in
the Chapter 3 model. In Chapter 2, perceptiveness approximately provides an added expected
value of 0.4 chips for an expert agent i and 0.5 chips for an inexpert agent i. In this poker
setting, the added value is actually quite substantial given that a player e↵ectively only loses 1
chip by folding and can only win or lose a maximum of 18 chips. In Chapter 3, perceptiveness
approximately provides an added expected value of 0.24% of monopolistic profit for an expert
agent i and 0.175% of monopolistic profit for an inexpert agent i. Although these calculations
involve a strictly larger µ-value in the Chapter 2 model than the Chapter 3 model, the di↵erence
in the magnitude of the value of perceptiveness in both models is enough for me to infer that
perceptiveness, despite generally having positive value in both games, is much more beneficial
in poker than it is in a market-entry setting. This is likely due to j’s payo↵-relevant realiza-
15These bounds can be determined by identifying which equilibrium region the corresponding (✏i, ✏ j) coordinate
lies within, then subsequently determining how far the regional boundary is from (✏i, ✏ j). For instance, suppose
(✏i, ✏ j) = (1/2, 1/2). By Theorem 3.3.12, the equilibrium is such that 1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2  (2 ✏i)✏ j and 1 ( ⇡D1 ⇡D )
2  (2 ✏ j)✏i.
Substituting ⇡D = 4/9 and ✏i = 1/2 yields equilibrium region conditions of ✏ j  3225 and 625  ✏ j. Therefore, the
maximum value for µ is 12   625 = 1350 .
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Figure 3.7: Agent i’s value of perceptiveness in Chapter 2, when (✏i, ✏ j) = (1/2,1/2) and µ = 1/2.
Figure 3.8: Agent i’s value of perceptiveness in Chapter 3, when (✏i, ✏ j) = (1/2,1/2) and ⇡D = 4/9.
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Figure 3.9: Agent i’s value of perceptiveness in Chapter 2, when ✏i 2 {0,1}, ✏ j = 1/2, and µ = 1/2.
Figure 3.10: Agent i’s value of perceptiveness in Chapter 3, when ✏i 2 {0,1}, ✏ j = 1/2, and
⇡D = 4/9.
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tion (hj) having a direct e↵ect on i’s payo↵ in the poker setting, whereas j’s payo↵-relevant
realization (  j) merely had an indirect e↵ect on i’s payo↵ in the market-entry setting.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I develop and study a model that depicts a two-player market-entry game fea-
turing a continuum of information structures. Player i is expert if they know their market-entry
fee,  i, prior to deciding whether to enter the market. Player i is perceptive if they know
whether their competitor j is expert. The information structures I consider vary in terms of the
players’ expertise and perceptiveness.
The main results that I find in this chapter are as follows. Under an equilibrium refinement
that treats the players as symmetrically as possible, when both players have a su ciently high
probability of being expert, the players’ value of perceptiveness is positive; whereas, if either
player is inexpert with a su ciently high probability, the players’ value of perceptiveness is
zero. Furthermore, the value of perceptiveness is always non-negative under the equilibrium
refinement I consider. Lastly, even when the value of perceptiveness is zero, perceptiveness
can still a↵ect the players’ equilibrium strategies.
Chapter 4
Perceptiveness in a Market-Entry,
Information Design Setting
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I apply the same notion of perceptiveness, which I investigated in Chapters 2 and
3, to a market-entry setting with an information designer. The information designer will have
the ability to influence the players’ market-entry decision by sending action recommendation
signals to the players. Doing so will subsequently influence the players’ individually optimal
behaviour, which will in turn help the information designer achieve a particular objective.
As noted in Bergemann and Morris (2019), information design literature has been covered
more extensively over the past decade. Furthermore, information design has spanned across
several distinct bodies of literature, such as Bayesian persuasion, Bayesian games with com-
munication, and literature pertaining to various economic applications of information design.
Bayesian persuasion literature, notably Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), typically features an
interaction between a receiver and a sender, who has an informational advantage over the re-
ceiver. The sender selects an informational signal to send to the receiver, who then chooses an
action, which subsequently determines the payo↵s that each player receives. Bayesian games
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with communication, notably Myerson (2013), typically features multiple players, including
a mediator that has no informational advantage over the other players. The mediator, in this
literature, can be viewed as an information designer. Additionally, some of the economic appli-
cations of information design include voter persuasion (Alonso & Câmara (2016)), the welfare
consequences of price discrimination (Bergemann, Brooks, & Morris (2015)), and matching
markets between schools and job placements (Ostrovsky & Schwarz (2010)).
In general, information design literature pertains to the instance of when the information
designer has an informational advantage over multiple players. Recent developments include
Bergemann and Morris (2019), Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020), and Taneva (2019). As
titled, Bergemann and Morris (2019) provides a unified perspective of information design. In
this paper, Bergemann and Morris (2019) provides an extensive review and comparison of
several bodies of literature, including Bayesian persuasion and communication in Bayesian
games, that incorporate information design. In addition to this, Bergemann and Morris (2019)
discuss the distinction between literal and metaphorical information design, information de-
sign’s relationship to mechanism design, and various applications of information design. Most
importantly, Bergemann and Morris (2019) outlines the general information design setting
and provides an investment example to illustrate how an information design problem can be
solved in four di↵erent scenarios: 1) Single player without prior information; 2) Single player
with prior information; 3) Many players without prior information; and 4) Many players with
prior information. Detailed solutions for this investment example are provided and explained
in Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016, 2019). The explanations of the investment example
outlined by these three papers provide a clear description of how to structure and solve an
information design problem, which proved invaluable as I developed this chapter.
Taneva (2019) details a general approach to deriving the information designer’s optimal
information structure in static finite environments. Taneva (2019) then applies this approach
to a symmetric binary environment, derives the corresponding constraint set, and solves for
the optimal information structure for an information designer wishing to miscoordinate actions
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between players. Following this, Taneva (2019) gives a complete characterization of the opti-
mal information structure for all possible symmetric information designer payo↵ functions in
a symmetric binary environment. Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) investigates informa-
tion design from a belief manipulation perspective by characterizing the feasible distribution of
players’ beliefs that an information designer can induce by their choice of information struc-
ture. Then, using their results, Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) develop a novel approach
to solving the information designer’s problem. Their approach features the information de-
signer first optimizing over private information, then sending out an optimal public signal.
My research in this chapter contributes to and departs from information design literature by
incorporating perceptiveness into an information design problem. I also determine the e↵ect
that perceptiveness has on an information designer’s ability to maximize producer surplus in a
market-entry setting. I find that if a governing body subsidizes market-entry by a su ciently
high amount (indicated by a su ciently small, negative market-entry fee), perceptiveness will
not a↵ect producer surplus nor the information designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing deci-
sion rule. Moreover, when both the high and low state entry fees are su ciently large, percep-
tiveness will not a↵ect the information designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule,
but will inflict negative value in terms of producer surplus.
Additionally, I find that when there is a su ciently small di↵erence between the high and
low state market-entry fees, perceptiveness will a↵ect the information designer’s producer-
surplus-maximizing decision rule. However, despite this, the maximized value of producer
surplus will only be a↵ected for market-entry fee di↵erences that are su ciently small, within
this already su ciently small di↵erence. Furthermore, when perceptiveness a↵ects the infor-
mation designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule and the maximized value of pro-
ducer surplus, perceptiveness will provide positive value, in terms of producer surplus, when
the high state market-entry fee is su ciently low. Contrarily, when perceptiveness a↵ects the
information designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule and the maximized value of
producer surplus, perceptiveness will inflict negative value, in terms of producer surplus, when
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the high state market-entry fee is su ciently high.
The remainder of this chapter is comprised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model,
specifically detailing the game I study. Section 4.3 develops the Bayes correlated equilibria
that the information designer can attain, taking into consideration any applicable constraints.
Section 4.4 highlights the information designer’s objective of maximizing producer surplus,
then outlines the decision rule that achieves this for all market-entry fee regions I consider.
Section 4.5 discusses the e↵ect that perceptiveness has on this information designer problem,
and subsequently discusses whether perceptiveness provides positive, zero, or negative value,
in terms of producer surplus, in each market-entry fee region. Section 4.6 concludes. Appendix
C provides the supplemental appendix for this chapter.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Players, Actions, States
I study a Bayesian game that features two players, A and B, that each produce the same product.
Both players must consider whether to “enter” (ai = Ei) or “not enter” (ai = Ni) the market in
which this product is sold. Player i’s payo↵ function is1
ui(ai, aj,  ) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if ai = Ni
⇡M     if (ai, aj) = (Ei,Nj)
⇡D     if (ai, aj) = (Ei, E j).
I let (⇡M, ⇡D) 2 R2+ and   2 { H,  L} where ( H,  L) 2 R2 such that  H   ⇡M > ⇡D >  L. In this
setting, ⇡M and ⇡D respectively represent the post-entry profit that a monopolist and duopolist
would receive by operating in the market. Furthermore,   represents the market-entry fee that
each player must pay to enter the market.2 There are two possible states of the world, H and
1 j will always denote i’s opponent.
2In this chapter, my model features a market-entry fee that is common for both players. Whereas, in Chapter
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L, which represent the high and low market-entry fees respectively. The high state occurs with
probability h 2 (0,1), whereas the low state occurs with probability (1 h). All of the above
is common knowledge to both players. Throughout my analysis, I focus attention towards a
parameterization of ⇡M = 1, ⇡D = 4/9, and h = 1/2. By doing so, I study a Cournot competition
market-entry setting with two states that are equally likely to occur. The microfoundations of
my model are discussed in Appendix C.1.
In addition to the two players, there is an omniscient information designer who can pro-
vide the players with additional information in order to induce them to make particular action
choices. Bergemann and Morris (2019) refers to the omniscient case as the case where the
information designer faces no constraints on their ability to condition the signals on the payo↵-
relevant states of the world and all players’ prior information. In this chapter, I focus my
attention to this case as opposed to cases where the players have some prior information that
the information designer is not privy to. Additionally, the objective of the information designer
will be to maximize producer surplus, given the state and the actions of each player. I will
address the information designer’s objective in more detail in Section 4.4.
4.2.2 Types
The parameter space for the information structures I consider is (✏A, ✏B) 2 (0,1)2, such that
✏A = ✏B, where ✏i represents the probability of player i knowing  . Each (✏A, ✏B) ordered pair
is common knowledge to both players and corresponds to a specific information structure. For
instance, suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). Here, ✏ j = 1/2, which implies that player i knows that
player j knows the state of the world with a probability of 1/2. Additionally, player i knows
that, with a probability of 1/2, player j believes the state of the world is H with probability h
and L with probability 1 h. For a second example, suppose (✏A, ✏B) = (1/4,1/4). Here, player
i knows that player j knows the state of the world with a probability of 1/4. Hence, player
i also knows that with a probability of 3/4, player j believes the state of the world is H with
3, each player had a separate draw for their market-entry fee.
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probability h and L with probability 1 h. Since (✏A, ✏B) is common knowledge, both players
know the probability that the other player believes them to know the state of the world with.
Since I focus on symmetry between ✏A and ✏B, I henceforth let ✏ = ✏A = ✏B.
Definition 4.2.1 Player i is perceptive if player i knows with certainty whether player j knows
the value of  .
Definition 4.2.1 classifies player i as perceptive if and only if ✏ j 2 {0,1}. Since I focus my
study on (✏A, ✏B) 2 (0,1)2, neither player will truly be perceptive in this setting. However, some
classes of players will be more perceptive than others. As shown by Reza (1994), uncertainty
is maximized when all potential outcomes occur with equal probability. Hence, the most im-
perceptive player i can be occurs when ✏ j = 1/2. Consequently, i becomes more perceptive as
|✏ j   12 | increases. Therefore, for instance, the players in the game featuring (✏A, ✏B) = (1/4,1/4)
are more perceptive than the players in the game featuring (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). Similarly, the
players in the game featuring (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2) are more imperceptive than the players in the
game featuring (✏A, ✏B) = (1/4,1/4). Consequently, since (✏A, ✏B) is common knowledge, each
player’s perceptiveness is common knowledge as well.
Definition 4.2.2 Player i is expert if player i knows   prior to making their market-entry deci-
sion.
Definition 4.2.2 classifies a player as expert if and only if such player knows the market-
entry fee prior to making their market-entry decision. If player i does not know the value of  
prior to making such decision, I classify player i as being inexpert.
Since both players are at least a little imperceptive, the type space for each player i is
ti 2 {Hi, Li, Ii}, since j is uncertain whether i is expert and knows the state with certainty or
inexpert and does not know the state with certainty. Player i is type Hi if i is expert and the
state is H; player i is type Li if i is expert and the state is L; and, player i is type Ii if i is
inexpert. Even as ✏i approaches 1 (or 0), there is still an ex-ante chance that i is inexpert (or
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expert). Thus, player i’s expertise is private information to i, since j will always believe there
to be some chance that i is expert and some chance that i is inexpert. Consequently, even if
both players know  s, where s 2 {H, L} represents the state, the state will not be common
knowledge to the players since both players believe there to be some positive probability that
the other does not know the true value of  .
4.2.3 Timeline
The timeline for each particular game is as follows. First, the information designer chooses
and commits to a state-contingent and expertise-contingent decision rule regarding the signal
recommendations they will send to each player. Second, the state s and the players’ expertise
is realized. Third, the information designer sends each player an action recommendation signal
corresponding to the information designer’s decision rule. Fourth, each player simultaneously
chooses whether to enter the market, taking into consideration the prior information and their
recommended action from the information designer. Fifth, payo↵s are realized.
4.3 Equilibria & Obedience Constraints
I consider the Bayes correlated equilibrium solution concept developed by Bergemann and
Morris (2016) when determining the information designer’s decision rule,
 ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s).
Specifically, the decision rule is a probability distribution over actions, given each player’s
type and the state, that the information designer bases their recommendations on. That is,
the decision rule  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s) represents the probability that the information designer
chooses to recommend the market-entry outcome (ai, aj), given the state and each player’s
type. The Bayes correlated equilibrium solution concept is founded upon having the players’
actions constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Bergemann and Morris (2019) shows that an omniscient information designer can attain
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a decision rule if and only if it is a Bayes correlated equilibrium. Additionally, Bergemann
and Morris (2016) shows that a Bayes correlated equilibrium only requires that the players be
obedient, which is defined by Definition 4.3.1.
Definition 4.3.1 Decision rule  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s) is obedient if for each i, ti 2 {Hi, Li, Ii}, and
ai 2 {Ei,Ni},
X
a j2{E j,N j}, t j2{H j,L j,I j}, s2{H,L}
ui((ai, aj), s) ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s)⇢((ti, t j)|s) (s)
 
X
a j2{E j,N j}, t j2{H j,L j,I j}, s2{H,L}
ui((a0i , aj), s) ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s)⇢((ti, t j)|s) (s) (4.1)
for all a0i 2 {E,N}, where ⇢ represents the probability distribution of types conditional on the
state, and  represents the probability distribution over the possible states.
A decision rule, is obedient if each player i, after receiving their action recommendation
ai, has no other action a0i that could provide them with a strictly higher payo↵. Definition 1
in Bergemann and Morris (2019) provides the technical definition of obedience in a general
information design setting. Definition 4.3.1 is an application, to my model, of Bergemann and
Morris (2019)’s definition of obedience. As shown in Bergemann and Morris (2016), a deci-
sion rule that satisfies obedience is a Bayes correlated equilibrium. Similarly, a decision rule,
 ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s), that satisfies obedience, in terms of Definition 4.3.1, is a Bayes correlated
equilibrium. Therefore, to solve for the Bayes correlated equilibria, I must determine which
decision rules are attainable for the information designer, based on the obedience constraints I
derive using Definition 4.3.1. Upon identifying all attainable Bayes correlated equilibria, I will
determine which attainable decision rule maximizes producer surplus.
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4.3.1 Obedience Constraints for Expert Agents
Using Definition 4.3.1, I can generate obedience constraints for an expert agent of type H, an
expert agent of type L, and an inexpert agent of type I. Each agent will have two obedience
constraints, one for entering the market (ai = E) and one for not entering the market (ai = N).
I henceforth denote each obedience constraint for i as OCtiai .
Lemma 4.3.1 If  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s) is obedient, then
1)  ((Ei, E j)|(Hi, t j),H) = 0;
2)  ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H) = 0;
3)  ((Ni, E j)|(Li, t j), L) = 0;
4)  ((Ni,Nj)|(Li, t j), L) = 0;
5)  ((NA,NB)|(HA,HB),H) = 1;
and 6)  ((EA, EB)|(LA, LB), L) = 1.
Proof Suppose i is expert and s = H. This implies that i’s type will be Hi. By Definition 4.3.1,
i’s obedience constraint for entering the market (ai = Ei), for all t j 2 {Hj, Lj, I j}, is
ui((Ei, E j),H) ((Ei, E j)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H)
+ ui((Ei,Nj),H) ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H)
  ui((Ni, E j),H) ((Ei, E j)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H) (4.2)
+ ui((Ni,Nj),H) ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H).
Since ui = 0 whenever ai = Ni, Inequality (4.2) simplifies to
ui((Ei, E j),H) ((Ei, E j)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H)
+ ui((Ei,Nj),H) ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H)   0.
Moreover, ui((Ei, E j),H) = ⇡D  H and ui((Ei,Nj),H) = ⇡M  H. Hence, i’s obedience con-
straint for entering the market further simplifies to
(⇡D  H) ((Ei, E j)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H)
+ (⇡M  H) ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H)⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H)   0. (4.3)
Recall that  H   ⇡M > ⇡D >  L. This implies that Inequality (4.3) will only be satisfied
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when  ((Ei, E j)|(Hi, t j),H) = 0 and  ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H) = 0, which must be the case since
⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H) 2 (0,1).3 Furthermore, by the laws of probability,
 ((EA, EB)|(HA,HB),H) +  ((EA,NB)|(HA,HB),H)
+  ((NA, EB)|(HA,HB),H) +  ((NA,NB)|(HA,HB),H) = 1.
This implies that  ((NA,NB)|(HA,HB),H) = 1.
Now suppose i is expert and s = L. This implies that i’s type will be Li. By Definition
4.3.1, i’s obedience constraint for not entering the market (ai = Ni), for all t j 2 {Hj, Lj, I j}, is
ui((Ni, E j), L) ((Ni, E j)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (H)
+ ui((Ni,Nj), L) ((Ni,Nj)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L)
  ui((Ei, E j), L) ((Ni, E j)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L) (4.4)
+ ui((Ei,Nj), L) ((Ni,Nj)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L)
Since ui = 0 whenever ai = Ni, Inequality (4.4) simplifies to
0   ui((Ei, E j), L) ((Ni, E j)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L)
+ ui((Ei,Nj), L) ((Ni,Nj)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L)
Moreover, ui((Ei, E j), L) = ⇡D  L and ui((Ei,Nj), L) = ⇡M  L. Hence, i’s obedience constraint
for entering the market further simplifies to
0   (⇡D  L) ((Ni, E j)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L)
+ (⇡M  L) ((Ni,Nj)|(Li, t j), L)⇢((Li, t j)|L) (L) (4.5)
Recall that  H   ⇡M > ⇡D >  L. This implies that Inequality (4.5) will only be satisfied
when  ((Ni, E j)|(Li, t j), L) = 0 and  ((Ni,Nj)|(Li, t j), L) = 0, which must be the case since
⇢((Hi, t j)|H) (H) 2 (0,1). Furthermore, by the laws of probability,
 ((EA, EB)|(LA, LB), L) +  ((EA,NB)|(LA, LB), L)
+  ((NA, EB)|(LA, LB), L) +  ((NA,NB)|(LA, LB), L) = 1.
This implies that  ((EA, EB)|(LA, LB), L) = 1.
3When ⇡M =  H , I restrict attention to decision rules where  ((Ei,Nj)|(Hi, t j),H) = 0.
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Lemma 4.3.1 implies that the information designer has no ability to influence the market-
entry decision of an expert agent. Since an expert agent knows the state prior to making their
market-entry decision, they will always enter in the low entry fee state and never enter in the
high entry fee state. As a result, for a decision rule   to be obedient, it is necessary that the
information designer always recommends entry to expert agents in the low entry fee state and
never recommends entry to expert agents in the high entry fee state. As such, I will henceforth
restrict attention to decision rules where the information designer always recommends entry to
expert agents in the low entry fee state, but never in the high entry fee state.
It can easily be verified that never recommending entry to an expert agent in the high
entry fee state satisfies the obedience constraint for not entering the market. Likewise, it can
easily be verified that always recommending entry to an expert agent in the low entry fee state
satisfies the obedience constraint for not entering the market. It is interesting to note that
an expert agent’s market-entry decision is made independent from their opponent’s expertise.
Additionally, if one player happens to be expert, a duopoly will never occur in the high entry
fee state; whereas, entry by at least one player will occur in the low entry fee state.
4.3.2 Obedience Constraints for Inexpert Agents
Since an inexpert agent does not know the state, the information designer will be able to influ-
ence their market-entry decision more substantially than they could with an expert agent. Let  s
represent the information designer’s probability of recommending an inexpert agent i to enter
the market in state s, given that player j is expert. Let ⌘s represent the information designer’s
probability of recommending an inexpert agent i to enter the market in state s, given that player
j is inexpert. Let ⌘sD represent the information designer’s probability of recommending both
inexpert agents to enter the market in state s, given that both players are inexpert. These action
recommendation variables are defined such that
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) 2 [0,1]6,
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where 2⌘L ⌘LD  1 and 2⌘H ⌘HD  1.
When both players are inexpert, the information designer must decide whether or not to
coordinate entry between the players. Because of this, I am required to define two separate
variables, ⌘s and ⌘sD, for each state in order to fully characterize the instance when both players
are inexpert. I restrict attention to symmetric decision rules,4 which is consistent with infor-
mation design literature, like Bergemann and Morris (2019). Tables 4.1-4.8 summarize the
probabilities associated with each market-entry outcome for the four possible configurations of
the players’ expertise.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 provide a breakdown of the components used to derive an inexpert
agent’s obedience constraint for entering the market, OCIE. Table 4.9 provides the components
for the left side of Definition 4.3.1, whereas Table 4.10 provides the components for the right
side. An inexpert agent’s obedience constraint for entering the market is
OCIE : h(1 ✏)2[⌘HD(⇡D  H) + (⌘H ⌘HD)(⇡M  H)]
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)2[⌘LD(⇡D  L) + (⌘L ⌘LD)(⇡M  L)]
+ h(1 ✏)✏ H(⇡M  H) (4.6)
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)✏ L(⇡D  L)   0.
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 provide a breakdown of the components used to derive an inexpert
agent’s obedience constraint for not entering the market, OCIN . Table 4.11 provides the com-
ponents for the right side of Definition 4.3.1, whereas Table 4.12 provides the components for
the left side. An inexpert agent’s obedience constraint for not entering the market is
OCIN : 0   h(1 ✏)2[(⌘H ⌘HD)(⇡D  H)+(1 2⌘H+⌘HD)(⇡M  H)]
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)2[(⌘L ⌘LD)(⇡D  L)+(1 2⌘L+⌘LD)(⇡M  L)]
+ h(1 ✏)✏(1  H)(⇡M  H) (4.7)
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)✏(1  L)(⇡D  L).
4That is, symmetric for agents with the same expertise.
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Table 4.1: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the high entry fee state when
both players are expert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters 0 0
A does not enter 0 1
Table 4.2: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the low entry fee state when
both players are expert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters 1 0
A does not enter 0 0
Table 4.3: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the high entry fee state when A
is inexpert and B is expert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters 0  H
A does not enter 0 1  H
Table 4.4: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the low entry fee state when A
is inexpert and B is expert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters  L 0
A does not enter 1  L 0
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Table 4.5: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the high entry fee state when A
is expert and B is inexpert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters 0 0
A does not enter  H 1  H
Table 4.6: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the low entry fee state when A
is expert and B is inexpert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters  L 1  L
A does not enter 0 0
Table 4.7: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the high entry fee state when
both players are inexpert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters ⌘HD ⌘
H ⌘HD
A does not enter ⌘H ⌘HD 1 2⌘H+⌘HD
Table 4.8: Probability distribution of market-entry outcomes in the low entry fee state when
both players are inexpert.
B enters B does not enter
A enters ⌘LD ⌘
L ⌘LD
A does not enter ⌘L ⌘LD 1 2⌘L+⌘LD
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Table 4.9: Summary of possible contingencies for an inexpert player (A), as well as the infor-
mation designer’s decision rule for recommending such player to enter the market.
State Types Probability Actions Decision Rule uA(a0A, aB)tA tB ⇢((ti, t j)|s) (s) a0A aA aB  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s)
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h EA EA EB ⌘HD ⇡D  H
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h EA EA NB ⌘H ⌘HD ⇡M  H
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) EA EA EB ⌘LD ⇡D  L
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) EA EA NB ⌘L ⌘LD ⇡M  L
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h EA EA EB 0 ⇡D  H
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h EA EA NB  H ⇡M  H
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) EA EA EB  L ⇡D  L
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) EA EA NB 0 ⇡M  L
Table 4.10: Summary of possible contingencies for an inexpert player (A), as well as the infor-
mation designer’s decision rule for recommending such player to enter the market.
State Types Probability Actions Decision Rule uA(a0A, aB)tA tB ⇢((ti, t j)|s) (s) a0A aA aB  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s)
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h NA EA EB ⌘HD 0
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h NA EA NB ⌘H ⌘HD 0
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) NA EA EB ⌘LD 0
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) NA EA NB ⌘L ⌘LD 0
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h NA EA EB 0 0
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h NA EA NB  H 0
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) NA EA EB  L 0
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) NA EA NB 0 0
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Table 4.11: Summary of possible contingencies for an inexpert player (A), as well as the infor-
mation designer’s decision rule for recommending such player to not enter the market.
State Types Probability Actions Decision Rule uA(a0A, aB)tA tB ⇢((ti, t j)|s) (s) a0A aA aB  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s)
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h EA NA EB ⌘H ⌘HD ⇡D  H
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h EA NA NB 1 2⌘H+⌘HD ⇡M  H
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) EA NA EB ⌘L ⌘LD ⇡D  L
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) EA NA NB 1 2⌘L+⌘LD ⇡M  L
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h EA NA EB 0 ⇡D  H
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h EA NA NB 1  H ⇡M  H
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) EA NA EB 1  L ⇡D  L
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) EA NA NB 0 ⇡M  L
Table 4.12: Summary of possible contingencies for an inexpert player (A), as well as the infor-
mation designer’s decision rule for recommending such player to not enter the market.
State Types Probability Actions Decision Rule uA(a0A, aB)tA tB ⇢((ti, t j)|s) (s) a0A aA aB  ((ai, aj)|(ti, t j), s)
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h NA NA EB ⌘H ⌘HD 0
H IA IB (1 ✏)2h NA NA NB 1 2⌘H+⌘HD 0
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) NA NA EB ⌘L ⌘LD 0
L IA IB (1 ✏)2(1 h) NA NA NB 1 2⌘L+⌘LD 0
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h NA NA EB 0 0
H IA HB (1 ✏)✏h NA NA NB 1  H 0
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) NA NA EB 1  L 0
L IA LB (1 ✏)✏(1 h) NA NA NB 0 0
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4.3.3 Equilibria
Combining Lemma 4.3.1 with both obedience constraints, OCIE and OC
I
N , for an inexpert agent,
provides the necessary existence conditions for a Bayes correlated equilibrium, given that ✏A =
✏B = ✏ and
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) 2 [0,1]6,
such that 2⌘H ⌘HD  1 and 2⌘L ⌘LD  1. Theorem 4.3.2 formalizes how to determine whether a
decision rule   constitutes a Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3.2 Suppose ✏A = ✏B = ✏. The decision rule
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD)
is a Bayes correlated equilibrium if and only if
1) ( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) 2 [0,1]6;
2) 2⌘L ⌘LD  1;
3) 2⌘H ⌘HD  1;
4) h(1 ✏)2[⌘HD(⇡D  H) + (⌘H ⌘HD)(⇡M  H)]
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)2[⌘LD(⇡D  L) + (⌘L ⌘LD)(⇡M  L)]
+ h(1 ✏)✏(⇡M  H) H
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)✏(⇡D  L) L   0;
and 5) 0   h(1 ✏)2[(⌘H ⌘HD)(⇡D  H)+(1 2⌘H+⌘HD)(⇡M  H)]
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)2[(⌘L ⌘LD)(⇡D  L)+(1 2⌘L+⌘LD)(⇡M  L)]
+ h(1 ✏)✏(⇡M  H)(1  H)
+ (1 h)(1 ✏)✏(⇡D  L)(1  L).
The proof of Theorem 4.3.2 follows from Lemma 4.3.1, Inequality (4.6), Inequality (4.7),
and the proof from Bergemann and Morris (2016) that shows that a Bayes correlated equi-
librium only requires that each player be obedient. Moving forward, I use Theorem 4.3.2 to
identify all attainable Bayes correlated equilibria. I then determine which of these equilibria
the information designer should select in order to maximize producer surplus.
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Corollary 4.3.3 The decision rule
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
is a Bayes correlated equilibrium for all (⇡M, ⇡D) 2 R2+ and ( H,  L) 2 R2 such that  H   ⇡M >
⇡D >  L.
Corollary 4.3.3 follows from substituting the
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
decision rule into Theorem 4.3.2. This corollary establishes that the set of attainable decision
rules for the information designer to select from is nonempty.
4.4 Maximizing Producer Surplus
I assume the market to follow a linear inverse demand curve of the form P = a   bQT , where
P represents the market price and QT represents the total quantity sold. I also assume that each
player produces identical products that can be produced with a marginal cost of zero and that
there are no fixed costs besides  . In this chapter, I consider an information designer whose
objective is to maximize producer surplus under Cournot competition. The calculations for the
equilibrium quantity, equilibrium price, consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus
for each market outcome are listed in Appendix C.1. Additionally, in Appendix C.1, I include
two diagrams that illustrate the regions of consumer and post-entry producer surplus, along
with the equilibrium outcome, for a duopoly and a monopoly. It is important to note that the
producer surplus the information designer maximizes accounts for the market-entry fees.5
Using the variables defined in Section 4.3.2 and the producer surplus computations in Ap-
pendix C.1, I obtain an expression for producer surplus, which is given by
5The regions of producer surplus shown in Appendix C.1 do not account for the market-entry fee(s). As such,
the producer surplus I measure for the information designer’s objective will be the corresponding shaded regions
less the applicable market-entry fee(s).
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PS ( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) =
2✏2(1 h)(49⇡M  L)
+ 2✏(1 ✏)[(1 h)(⇡M  L) (1 h)(19⇡M+ L) L h( H ⇡M) H] (4.8)
+ 2(1 ✏)2[(1 h)(⇡M  L)⌘L h( H ⇡M)⌘H 59 (1 h)⇡M⌘LD 59h⇡M⌘HD].
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, I focus attention towards a situation where h = 1/2, ⇡M = 1, and
⇡D = 4/9. As such, Equation (4.8) reduces to
PS ( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) =
✏2( 49  L) + ✏(1 ✏)[(1  L) (19+ L) L ( H 1) H] (4.9)
+ (1 ✏)2[(1  L)⌘L ( H 1)⌘H 59⌘LD 59⌘HD].
I segment my analysis into four regions of the “ H  L” plane, where  H   1 > 4/9 >  L.
These regions are6
1) ( H,  L) 2 [1,1) ⇥ ( 1, 1/9];
2) ( H,  L) 2 [14/9,1) ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9);
3) ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) and  H   1+12 (1+✏)(49  L);
and 4) ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) and  H  1+12 (1+✏)(49  L).
I further segment the fourth region into four separate subregions. Given that
( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) and  H  1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L),
these four subregions are
1)  H  L   109 and  H 2 [1+12 (1 ✏)( 49  L), 1+12 (1+✏)(49  L)];
2)  H  L   109 and  H 2 [1, 1+12 (1 ✏)( 49  L)];
3)  H  L  109 and  H 2 [ 2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L, 1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L)];
and 4)  H  L  109 and  H 2 [1, 2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L].
6The section and subsection headings for Regions 1, 3, 4, and 4.1-4.4 (on the following pages) should have a
square bracket “]” instead of a rounded bracket “)” wherever a square bracket “]” occurs when I list the regions
and subregions in the text. There seems to be a “Table of Contents” macro in the Western Thesis LaTeX template
that restricts me from using the square bracket “]” in section and subsection headings.
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4.4.1 Region 1: ( H,  L) 2 [1,1) ⇥ ( 1, 1/9)
Theorem 4.4.1 If ( H,  L) 2 [1,1) ⇥ ( 1, 1/9], then the producer-surplus-maximizing deci-
sion rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0). (4.10)
Proof This solution can be verified by showing that the gradient of the producer surplus is a
linear combination of a non-negative weighted average of the gradients for the binding con-
straints. Here, the binding constraints are 2⌘L ⌘LD  1, the non-negativity constraints for  H,
⌘H, and ⌘HD, as well as the upper bound constraints for  
L, ⌘L, and ⌘LD. The weights
( 2⌘L ⌘LD1,   L1,   H 0,  ⌘L1,  ⌘LD1,  ⌘H 0,  ⌘HD 0)
= ( 59 (1 ✏)2, ✏(1 ✏)( 19  L), ✏(1 ✏)( H 1), ✏(1 ✏)( 19  L), 0, (1 ✏)2( H 1), 59 (1 ✏)2)
satisfy the expression
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0  1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0
 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0  1
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
⇥
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 2⌘L ⌘LD1
  L1
  H 0
 ⌘L1
 ⌘LD1
 ⌘H 0
 ⌘HD 0
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
=
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
 ✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
(1 ✏)2(1  L)
 59 (1 ✏)2
 (1 ✏)2( H 1)
 59 (1 ✏)2
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
, (4.11)
where the columns of the 6 ⇥ 7 matrix represent the binding constraints, while each row repre-
sents a particular decision variable.7 Furthermore, the 6 ⇥ 1 matrix represents the gradient of
producer surplus. Additionally, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L   1/9, and  H   1, the weights can each be
shown to be non-negative.
7Throughout this chapter, the order of rows for each matrix that does not contain weights is  L,  H , ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H ,
and ⌘HD . The order of columns in each left-most matrix begins with any applicable obedience constraints, followed
by any applicable market-entry outcome probability constraints, followed by any binding non-negativity or upper
bound constraints listed in the order of  L,  H , ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H , and ⌘HD .
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4.4.2 Region 2: ( H,  L) 2 [14/9,1) ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9)
Theorem 4.4.2 If ( H,  L) 2 [14/9,1) ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9), then the producer-surplus-maximizing deci-
sion rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (0, 0, 1/2, 0, 0, 0).
Proof This solution can be verified by showing that the gradient of the producer surplus is
a linear combination of a non-negative weighted average of the gradients for the binding con-
straints. Here, the binding constraints are 2⌘L ⌘LD  1, as well as the non-negativity constraints
for  L,  H, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, and ⌘HD. The weights
( 2⌘L ⌘LD1,   L 0,   H 0,  ⌘LD 0,  ⌘H 0,  ⌘HD 0)
= (12 (1 ✏)2(1  L), ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L), ✏(1 ✏)( H 1), (4.12)
1
2(1 ✏)2(19+ L), (1 ✏)2( H 1), 59 (1 ✏)2)
satisfy the expression
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
0  1 0 0 0 0
0 0  1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
 1 0 0  1 0 0
0 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0  1
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
⇥
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 2⌘L ⌘LD1
  L 0
  H 0
 ⌘LD 0
 ⌘H 0
 ⌘HD 0
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
=
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
 ✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
(1 ✏)2(1  L)
 59 (1 ✏)2
 (1 ✏)2( H 1)
 59 (1 ✏)2
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
(4.13)
where the columns of the 6 ⇥ 6 matrix represent the binding constraints, while each row repre-
sents a particular decision variable. Furthermore, the 6⇥ 1 matrix on the right side of Equation
(4.13) represents the gradient of producer surplus. Additionally, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9),
and  H   14/9, the weights can each be shown to be non-negative.
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4.4.3 Region 3: ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9) ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) &  H   1 + 12(1+✏)(49  L)
Theorem 4.4.3 If ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) such that  H   1 + 12 (1+✏)( 49  L), then the
producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (0, 0, 1/2, 0, 0, 0).
Proof This solution can be verified by using an identical process, matrix equation, and weights
as those used in the proof of Theorem 4.4.2. Furthermore, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9), and
 H 2 [1,14/9], the weights can each be shown to be non-negative.
4.4.4 Region 4: ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9) ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) &  H  1+12(1+✏)(49  L)
Region 4.1:  H  L   109 &  H 2 [1+12 (1 ✏)( 49  L), 1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L))
Theorem 4.4.4 If ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) such that
 H  L   109 ,
 H  1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L),
and  H   1+12 (1 ✏)( 49  L),
then the producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (
(1+✏)( 49  L)   2( H 1)
2✏( 49  L)
, 0, 1/2, 0, 0, 0).
Proof This solution can be verified by showing that the gradient of the producer surplus is a
linear combination of a non-negative weighted average of the gradients for the binding con-
straints. Here, the binding constraints are the OCIN , 2⌘
L ⌘LD  1, as well as the non-negativity
constraints for  H, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, and ⌘HD. The weights
( OCIN ,  2⌘L ⌘LD1,   H 0,  ⌘LD 0,  ⌘H 0,  ⌘HD 0)
= (
(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
( 49  L)
,
25(1 ✏)2
81(49  L)
,
5✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
9(49  L)
, 0,
5(1 ✏)2[( H 1) ( 19+ L)]
9(49  L)
,
25(1 ✏)2
81(49  L)
)
(4.14)
satisfy the expression
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2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏( 49  L) 0 0 0 0 0
✏( H 1) 0  1 0 0 0
 (1 ✏)( 149   L) 2 0 0 0 0
5
9(1 ✏)  1 0  1 0 0
 (1 ✏)( 149   H) 0 0 0  1 0
5
9(1 ✏) 0 0 0 0  1
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
⇥
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 OCIN
 2⌘L ⌘LD1
  H 0
 ⌘LD 0
 ⌘H 0
 ⌘HD 0
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
=
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
 ✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
(1 ✏)2(1  L)
 59 (1 ✏)2
 (1 ✏)2( H 1)
 59 (1 ✏)2
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
(4.15)
where the columns of the 6 ⇥ 6 matrix represent the binding constraints, while each row repre-
sents a particular decision variable. Furthermore, the 6⇥ 1 matrix on the right side of Equation
(4.15) represents the gradient of producer surplus. Additionally, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9),
 H 2 [1,14/9], and ( H 1) ( 19+ L)   0, the weights can each be shown to be non-negative.
Region 4.2:  H  L   109 &  H 2 [1, 1+12 (1 ✏)( 49  L))
Theorem 4.4.5 If ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) such that
 H  L   109
and  H  1+12 (1 ✏)( 49  L),
then the producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (1, 0, 1 
( H 1)
(1 ✏)( 49  L)
, 1  2( H 1)
(1 ✏)( 49  L)
, 0, 0)
Proof This solution can be verified by showing that the gradient of the producer surplus is a
linear combination of a non-negative weighted average of the gradients for the binding con-
straints. Here, the binding constraints are the OCIN , 2⌘
L ⌘LD  1, the upper bound constraint
for  L, and the non-negativity constraints for  H, ⌘H, and ⌘HD. The weights
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( OCIN ,  2⌘L ⌘LD1,   L1,   H 0,  ⌘H 0,  ⌘HD 0)
= (
(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
( 49  L)
,
25(1 ✏)2
81(49  L)
, 0,
5✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
9(49  L)
,
5(1 ✏)2[( H 1) ( 19+ L)]
9(49  L)
,
25(1 ✏)2
81(49  L)
)
(4.16)
satisfy the expression
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(49  L) 0 1 0 0 0
✏( H 1) 0 0  1 0 0
 (1 ✏)(149   L) 2 0 0 0 0
5
9(1 ✏)  1 0 0 0 0
 (1 ✏)( 149   H) 0 0 0  1 0
5
9(1 ✏) 0 0 0 0  1
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
⇥
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 OCIN
 2⌘L ⌘LD1
  L1
  H 0
 ⌘H 0
 ⌘HD 0
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
=
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
 ✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
(1 ✏)2(1  L)
 59 (1 ✏)2
 (1 ✏)2( H 1)
 59 (1 ✏)2
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
(4.17)
where the columns of the 6 ⇥ 6 matrix represent the binding constraints, while each row repre-
sents a particular decision variable. Furthermore, the 6⇥ 1 matrix on the right side of Equation
(4.17) represents the gradient of producer surplus. Additionally, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9),
 H 2 [1,14/9], and ( H 1) ( 19+ L)   0, the weights can each be shown to be non-negative.
Region 4.3:  H  L  109 &  H 2 [ 2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L, 1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L))
Theorem 4.4.6 If ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) such that
 H  L  109 ,
 H  1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L),
and  H   2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L,
then the producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (0, 0, 1/2, 0,
1
2 (1+✏)(
4
9  L)   ( H 1)
(1 ✏)( 149   H)
, 0)
Proof This solution can be verified by showing that the gradient of the producer surplus is a
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linear combination of a non-negative weighted average of the gradients for the binding con-
straints. Here, the binding constraints are the OCIN , 2⌘
L ⌘LD  1, as well as the non-negativity
constraints for  L,  H, ⌘LD, and ⌘
H
D. The weights
( OCIN ,  2⌘L ⌘LD1,   L 0,   H 0,  ⌘LD 0,  ⌘HD 0)
= (
(1 ✏)( H 1)
(149   H)
,
5(1 ✏)2( H  L)
18(149   H)
,
5✏(1 ✏)[( 19+ L) ( H 1)]
9(149   H)
, (4.18)
5✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
9(149   H)
,
5(1 ✏)2[( 19+ L) ( H 1)]
18(149   H)
,
25(1 ✏)2
81(149   H)
)
satisfy the expression
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏( 49  L) 0  1 0 0 0
✏( H 1) 0 0  1 0 0
 (1 ✏)( 149   L) 2 0 0 0 0
5
9(1 ✏)  1 0 0  1 0
 (1 ✏)( 149   H) 0 0 0 0 0
5
9(1 ✏) 0 0 0 0  1
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
⇥
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 OCIN
 2⌘L ⌘LD1
  L 0
  H 0
 ⌘LD 0
 ⌘HD 0
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
=
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
 ✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
(1 ✏)2(1  L)
 59 (1 ✏)2
 (1 ✏)2( H 1)
 59 (1 ✏)2
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
(4.19)
where the columns of the 6 ⇥ 6 matrix represent the binding constraints, while each row repre-
sents a particular decision variable. Furthermore, the 6⇥ 1 matrix on the right side of Equation
(4.19) represents the gradient of producer surplus. Additionally, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9),
 H 2 [1,14/9],  H >  L, and (19+ L) ( H 1)   0, the weights can each be shown to be non-
negative.
Region 4.4:  H  L  109 &  H 2 [1, 2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L)
Theorem 4.4.7 If ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) such that
 H  L  109
and  H  2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L,
then the producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule is
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( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (
( 49  L) ( H 1) (1 ✏)(1 12 L 12 H)
✏( 49  L)
, 0, 1/2, 0, 1/2, 0)
Proof This solution can be verified by showing that the gradient of the producer surplus is a
linear combination of a non-negative weighted average of the gradients for the binding con-
straints. Here, the binding constraints are the OCIN , 2⌘
L ⌘LD  1, 2⌘H ⌘HD  1, as well as the
non-negativity constraints for  H, ⌘LD, and ⌘
H
D. The weights
( OCIN ,  2⌘L ⌘LD1,  2⌘H ⌘HD1,   H 0,  ⌘LD 0,  ⌘HD 0)
= (
(1 ✏)(19+ L)
( 49  L)
,
25(1 ✏)2
81(49  L)
,
5(1 ✏)2[(19+ L) ( H 1)]
18(49  L)
, (4.20)
5✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
9(49  L)
, 0,
5(1 ✏)2( H  L)
18(49  L)
)
satisfy the expression
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(49  L) 0 0 0 0 0
✏( H 1) 0 0  1 0 0
 (1 ✏)(149   L) 2 0 0 0 0
5
9(1 ✏)  1 0 0  1 0
 (1 ✏)( 149   H) 0 2 0 0 0
5
9(1 ✏) 0  1 0 0  1
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
⇥
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 OCIN
 2⌘L ⌘LD1
 2⌘H ⌘HD1
  H 0
 ⌘LD 0
 ⌘HD 0
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
=
2
666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
 ✏(1 ✏)( 19+ L)
 ✏(1 ✏)( H 1)
(1 ✏)2(1  L)
 59 (1 ✏)2
 (1 ✏)2( H 1)
 59 (1 ✏)2
3
777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
(4.21)
where the columns of the 6 ⇥ 6 matrix represent the binding constraints, while each row repre-
sents a particular decision variable. Furthermore, the 6⇥ 1 matrix on the right side of Equation
(4.21) represents the gradient of producer surplus. Additionally, since ✏ 2 (0,1),  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9),
 H 2 [1,14/9],  H >  L, and (19+ L) ( H 1)   0, the weights can each be shown to be non-
negative.
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4.5 The E↵ect of Perceptiveness
As shown by Theorem 4.4.1, when ( H,  L) 2 [1,1) ⇥ ( 1, 1/9] the information designer’s
producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0).
Since this decision rule is independent of ✏, perceptiveness does not a↵ect the information de-
signer’s producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule when ( H,  L) 2 [1,1) ⇥ ( 1, 1/9]. Addi-
tionally, this decision rule represents the instance of when the information designer completely
reveals the state to both players, regardless of their expertise. Because of this, perceptiveness
does not a↵ect producer surplus nor does it a↵ect the obedience constraints for each player.
Theorems 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 show that when ( H,  L) 2 [14/9,1) ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) or when  H  
1+12 (1+✏)(
4
9  L), such that ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9), the information designer’s producer-
surplus-maximizing decision rule is
( L,  H, ⌘L, ⌘LD, ⌘
H, ⌘HD) = (0, 0, 1/2, 0, 0, 0).
Similar to when  L 2 ( 1, 1/9], perceptiveness does not a↵ect the information designer’s
producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule nor does it a↵ect the obedience constraints in these
“ H  L” regions. However, with this decision rule, producer surplus simplifies to
PS = 12 (1  L)   12 ( 19+ L)✏2
which is concave in ✏, since  L 2 [ 1/9, 4/9). As illustrated by the oil investment example listed
in Appendix B.2, non-linearity in ✏ indicates that perceptiveness will have an e↵ect. Since
producer surplus is concave in ✏, the value of perceptiveness, in terms of producer surplus, is
negative when either ( H,  L) 2 [14/9,1) ⇥ ( 1/9, 4/9), or ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ ( 1/9, 4/9) such that
 H   1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L).
When ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9) and  H  1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L), as shown by Theorems
4.4.4-4.4.7, perceptiveness will a↵ect the information designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing
decision rule since at least one of the decision rule variables is nonlinear in ✏. Regardless
of the four subregions within this “ H  L” region, the OCIN will bind and the OCIE will be
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slack. Hence, in this region, perceptiveness will not a↵ect whether either obedience constraint
is binding or slack. However, when ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9),  H  L   109 , and  H 
1+12 (1+✏)(
4
9  L),8 substituting the producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule variables into
Equation (4.9) finds that producer surplus equals
(49  L) + (1 ✏)
( 19+ L)( H 1)
(49  L)
,
which is linear in ✏. Therefore, when ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9),  H  L   109 , and  H 
1+12 (1+✏)(
4
9  L), perceptiveness does not a↵ect the maximized value of producer surplus.
When ( H,  L) 2 [1,14/9] ⇥ [ 1/9, 4/9),  H  L  109 , and  H  1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L), substituting
the producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule variables into Equation (4.9) finds that producer
surplus is nonlinear in ✏, so perceptiveness will a↵ect the maximized producer surplus in Re-
gions 4.3 and 4.4. More specifically, given the region specification that begins this paragraph
as well as9
 H 2 [ 2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L, 1+12 (1+✏)( 49  L)],
the second derivative of producer surplus with respect to ✏, when substituting in the producer-
surplus-maximizing decision rule variables, is
5[( H  L) 109 ]
9(149   H)
. (4.22)
Additionally, given the same initial region specification, but instead supplementing with10
 H 2 [1, 2(1+✏) ( 49+✏)  L],
the second derivative of producer surplus with respect to ✏, when substituting in the producer-
surplus-maximizing decision rule variables, is
5[109  ( H  L)]
9(49  L)
. (4.23)
Since  H    L  109 in Regions 4.3 and 4.4, Expression (4.22) shows that the second derivative
8This specification corresponds to Regions 4.1 and 4.2.
9This specification corresponds to Region 4.3.
10This specification corresponds to Region 4.4.
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of producer surplus with respect to ✏ is non-positive in Region 4.3; whereas, Expression (4.23)
shows that the second derivative of producer surplus with respect to ✏ is non-negative in Region
4.4. This implies that, if  H   L < 109 , then perceptiveness will provide negative value in terms
of producer surplus in Region 4.3. Whereas, if  H    L < 109 , then perceptiveness will provide
positive value in terms of producer surplus in Region 4.4.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the e↵ect that perceptiveness has on an information design problem in
a market-entry setting. I specifically investigate the e↵ect that perceptiveness has when the
information designer wishes to maximize producer surplus.
I find that perceptiveness a↵ects the information designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing
decision rule when the di↵erence between the high and low market-entry fee states is su -
ciently small, as depicted by Regions 4.1-4.4. Additionally, perceptiveness provides positive
value, in terms of producer surplus, only when the di↵erence between the high and low state
market-entry fees is su ciently small and the high state market-entry fee is su ciently low, as
depicted by Region 4.4. Contrarily, perceptiveness inflicts negative value, in terms of producer
surplus, when the high and low state market-entry fees are both su ciently high, as depicted
by Regions 2, 3, and 4.3. I also find that, despite perceptiveness a↵ecting the information
designer’s producer-surplus-maximizing decision rule when the di↵erence between the high
and low market-entry fee states is su ciently small, if such di↵erence is still adequately large,
the maximized value of producer surplus will not change with perceptiveness, as depicted by
Regions 4.1 and 4.2. Finally, I find that perceptiveness has no e↵ect when the low state market-
entry fee is a su ciently small, negative value, as depicted by Region 1.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Throughout my thesis, I investigate the value and e↵ect of perceptiveness in various game-
theoretic settings. The first model, covered in Chapter 2, emulates a two-player, one-round
game of poker. The second model, covered in Chapter 3, features a two-player market-entry
game. The third model, covered in Chapter 4, depicts a two-player market-entry game that is
influenced by an information designer who aims to maximize producer surplus.
A player is expert if and only if they know the value of a particular payo↵-relevant param-
eter. Furthermore, a player is perceptive if and only if they know whether their opponent is
expert. I let ✏i represent the probability of player i knowing the value of such payo↵-relevant
parameter. In my first model, the payo↵-relevant parameters of interest are the players’ hand
values, (hi, hj). Here, player i is expert if and only if they know the value of hi. In my second
model, the payo↵-relevant parameters of interest are the players’ market-entry fees, ( i,   j).
Here, player i is expert if and only if they know the value of  i. Lastly, in my third model,
the payo↵-relevant parameter of interest is the market-entry fee,  , which is the same for both
players. Here, player i is expert if and only if they know the value of  .
In each model, I restrict attention to a di↵erent subset of (✏A, ✏B) ordered pairs. In the first
model, I consider
(✏A, ✏B) 2 {(0,0), (0,1), (1,1), (0,1/2), (1,1/2), (1/2,1/2)},
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In the second model, I consider (✏A, ✏B) 2 [0,1]2. In the third model, I consider (✏A, ✏B) 2 (0,1)2
such that ✏A = ✏B.
In my thesis, I find that perceptiveness generally has value to players, whether that be
from the perspective of a poker player, a player considering market-entry, or an information
designer in a market-entry game. To draw comparisons between the three models, consider the
information structure where (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). This particular information structure is good for
comparison since it represents the information structure in which the perceptiveness of each
player is minimized, and is also featured in my analysis of each model. In order to make the
three models as comparable as possible, I set the model-specific parameters to be as follows.
In Model 1, I set the chip endowment (K) equal to 15. In Model 2, I set the duopoly profit (⇡D)
equal to 4/9, and I set the change in player A’s perceptiveness (µ) equal to 1/5. Lastly, in Model
3, I set the probability of the high-state market-entry fee occurring (h) equal to 1/2, the duopoly
profit (⇡D) equal to 4/9, the monopoly profit (⇡M) equal to 1, the high-state market-entry fee
( H) equal to 1, the low-state market-entry fee ( L) equal to 0, and the change in the players’
perceptiveness (µ) equal to 1/5.
First, consider Model 1 when (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). Suppose player i could choose between a
situation where they must decide whether to go all-in or fold before realizing j’s expertise, or
a situation where Nature can flip a coin to have the uncertainty of j’s expertise realized prior
to i deciding whether to go all-in or fold, with j knowing that i has realized this information.
The former situation corresponds to when i is imperceptive and the latter situation corresponds
to when i is perceptive. My results show that, for instance when K = 15, player i would prefer
to have the uncertainty of j’s expertise realized prior to deciding whether to go all-in or fold.
So, in this situation, perceptiveness is beneficial to player i. This result is generally true for all
stakes regardless of i’s expertise and j’s perceptiveness.1
Next, consider Model 2 when (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2). As in Model 1, certain qualifications
1There exists some stakes where an expert player i has a negative value of perceptiveness when facing a
perceptive player j. However, this case seems to be a particular exception. Also, for su ciently low stakes, i’s
value of perceptiveness is zero. This occurs when K = 1, or when i is inexpert, j is perceptive, and K  2+
p
5.
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must be met in order for perceptiveness to have value. For instance, in Model 2, I focus
attention to the “middle equilibrium”. I also consider di↵erent values for duopolistic profit,
similar to how I considered di↵erent stakes in Model 1. However, in general, starting from
(✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2), staying close to this, introducing more perceptiveness to i, and maintaining
focus on the “middle equilibrium”, perceptiveness has value to i. Similar findings can be made
at other (✏A, ✏B) starting points, deviations, and duopolistic profit values.
Model 3 is di↵erent than Models 1 and 2 since Model 3 is normative, whereas Models 1
and 2 are positive. In Model 3, the information designer is trying to determine what could
conceivably be possible in society in order to maximize producer surplus. Since this model
is much more di cult, as it involves maximizing surplus over the correlated equilibria in a
market-entry game, I had to assume that both players have the same market-entry fee and re-
strict my attention to symmetric decision rules. Hence, I can only consider moving from the
(✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2) starting point by simultaneously changing both players’ probability of being
expert, as well as both players’ perceptiveness. As it turns out, when (h, ⇡D, ⇡M,  H,  L, µi, µ j) =
(1/2,4/9,1,1,0,1/5,1/5), while starting at (✏A, ✏B) = (1/2,1/2), perceptiveness increases the informa-
tion designer’s maximum attainable producer surplus. So, perceptiveness is once again bene-
ficial, just from a di↵erent perspective. Although this comparison has many fixed parameters,
the parameters are fixed in a way that makes the results between the three models roughly
compatible.
Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 2
A.1 Payo↵ Grid: Inexpert Agent i Choosing All-In vs. Ex-
pert Agent j
Figure A.1: An inexpert i’s payo↵ from choosing all-in against an expert j using the cut-o↵
strategy,   j, across all possible states.
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Appendix B
Appendices for Chapter 3
B.1 Cournot Competition: Derivation of ⇡D = 4/9
.
I consider a market that follows a linear inverse demand curve and a situation such that the
players’ products are identically-perceived by consumers. Hence, the inverse market demand
curve is
P(qA, qB) = a   bqA   bqB.
Suppose that both players enter the market. This implies that i’s post-entry profit is given by
⇡i,D(qi, qj) = P(qi, qj)qi   MCiqi. (B.1)
I also assume that MCi = 0. Hence, Equation (B.1) simplifies to
⇡i,D(qi, qj) = (a   bqi   bqj)qi. (B.2)
Taking the first-order condition of ⇡i,D(qi, qj) with respect to qi, for i 2 {A,B}, yields
qBRA (qB) =
a   bqB
2b
(B.3)
and qBRB (qA) =
a   bqA
2b
. (B.4)
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Substituting qBRB (qA) into Equation (B.3) yields
q⇤A =
a
3b
Similarly, q⇤B =
a
3b . Substituting q
⇤
A = q
⇤
B =
a
3b into Equation (B.2) finds that
⇡i,D(qi, qj) =
a2
9b
. (B.5)
Now suppose that player i enters the market as a monopolist. This implies that i’s post-entry
profit is
⇡i,M(qi, 0) = (a   bqi)qi. (B.6)
Taking the first-order condition of ⇡i,M(qi, 0) with respect to qi yields
q⇤i =
a
2b
.
Substituting q⇤i =
a
2b into Equation (B.6) finds that
⇡i,M =
a2
4b
.
Normalizing ⇡i,M = 1 implies that a
2
b = 4. Substituting this into Equation (B.5) yields ⇡i,D = 4/9.
B.2 Example: Oil Investment Decision Problem
The value of perceptiveness I study is analogous to the value of testing for oil in the following
decision problem. Consider a risk-neutral oil company that knows that oil exists in a certain
location with a probability of p 2 [0,1]. The company can choose x 2 {0,1}, where x = 1
(x = 0) represents when the company decides to drill (not drill) for oil. The state of the world
is given by s 2 {0,1}, where s = 1 (s = 0) indicates that oil is present (absent). The value from
striking oil is v, while the cost of building an oil rig is c, such that v and c are positive numbers.
The company’s payo↵ function is summarized as
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⇡(v, c, s, x) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
v   c if s = 1 & x = 1
 c if s = 0 & x = 1
0 if x = 0.
Given the company’s payo↵ function, the company’s expected payo↵ is
E[⇡(v, c, p, x)] =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
pv   c if x = 1
0 if x = 0.
This implies that the company should drill for oil if p   cv .
Suppose v = 100, c = 70, and p = 4/5. The oil company should choose to drill (x = 1)
since p > 7/10. By drilling, the company has an expected profit of 10. Now suppose the
company is presented with the opportunity to acquire additional information pertaining to the
probability of striking oil. There is a 50% chance this information will be favourable, allowing
the company to update its beliefs to p = 1. However, there is a 50% chance this information will
be unfavourable, causing the company to update its beliefs to p = 3/5. The company’s expected
profit with this information is 15. Hence, this information is clearly valuable to the company
as it increases the company’s expected profit by 5. This example is graphically depicted by
Figure B.1.1
The value of information in this example comes from the oil company’s ability to make
its decision contingent on the updated probabilities. Without receiving the additional infor-
mation, the company will decide to drill. This decision will remain unchanged in the pres-
ence of favourable information. However, in the presence of unfavourable information, the
company will switch its decision to deciding not to drill. Generally speaking, if one of the
post-information states results in the company switching its decision away from what it would
have previously chosen, the value of information is strictly positive. Otherwise, the value of
1In Figure B.1, the blue solid line represents the company’s expected profit without additional information.
The yellow dashed line represents the company’s expected profit with additional information. The green dotted
line represents the value of information when the probability of striking oil is 4/5.
B.2. Example: Oil Investment Decision Problem 97
Figure B.1: Oil company’s expected profit from striking oil given the probability of striking
oil.
information is zero. Proposition B.2.1 claims that the oil company’s expected profit function
is convex for all p, and strictly convex if and only if a mean-preserving spread of p has bound
values pLow and pHigh such that 0  pLow < cv  pHigh  1. In other words, the expected
profit function is strictly convex if and only if the oil company makes its decision based on the
information it acquires. From this, it follows that the value of information is zero if and only
if the information puts the oil company at a mean-preserving spread of p with pLow   cv or
pHigh < cv . Additionally, the value of information is positive if and only if the information puts
the oil company at a mean-preserving spread of p with 0  pLow < cv  pHigh  1.
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Proposition B.2.1 Suppose v > c > 0.
E[⇡(p)] =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
pv   c if p   cv
0 if p < cv
is convex for all p 2 [0,1], and strictly convex if and only if a mean-preserving spread of p has
bound values pLow and pHigh such that 0  pLow < cv  pHigh  1.
Proof Suppose (p1, p2) 2 [0,1]2 such that p1 < p2, v > c > 0, and ↵ 2 [0,1]. If p2 < cv , then
E[⇡(↵p1 + (1 ↵)p2)] = 0 = ↵E[⇡(p1)]+ (1 ↵)E[⇡(p2)], which implies that E[⇡(p)] is convex,
but not strictly convex for all ↵ 2 [0,1]. If p1   cv , then
E[⇡(↵p1 + (1 ↵)p2)] = (↵p1 + (1 ↵)p2)v   c
= ↵(p1v   c) + (1 ↵)(p2v   c)
= ↵E[⇡(p1)] + (1 ↵)E[⇡(p2)],
which implies that E[⇡(p)] is convex, but not strictly convex for all ↵ 2 [0,1]. Finally, if
p1 < cv  p2, then
E[⇡(↵p1 + (1 ↵)p2)] = (↵p1 + (1 ↵)p2)v   c
= ↵p1v + (1 ↵)p2v   c
< ↵c + (1 ↵)p2v   c
= ↵(0) + (1 ↵)(p2v   c)
= ↵E[⇡(p1)] + (1 ↵)E[⇡(p2)],
which implies that E[⇡(p)] is strictly convex for all ↵ 2 [0,1].
This oil investment decision problem and subsequent analysis to derive the value of in-
formation was inspired by Section 12.5 of DeGroot (2005). In such section, DeGroot (2005)
develops optimal bounded sequential decision procedures that feature a statistician deciding
whether to observe an additional observation at some arbitrary positive cost. By finding where
the oil company is indi↵erent between having the pre-information expected profit in addition
to the cost of acquiring such information and the post-information expected profit, I am able to
infer the value of this information.
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B.3 Proof of Corollary 3.4.5
Proof To prove that perceptiveness has zero value and e↵ect for i when their opponent j enters
the market with the same probability regardless of j’s expertise, it is su cient to show that
agent i’s best response and ex-ante expected payo↵ is independent of ✏ j when   j = ⌘ j.
Suppose (✏i, ✏ j) 2 (0,1)2 and that j enters the market with probability ⇢ j regardless of j’s
expertise (  j = ⌘ j = ⇢ j). Further suppose that i is expert. Equation (3.2) shows that i’s best
response will be  BRi (⇢ j) = 1   ⇢ j(1 ⇡D). Moreover, Equation (3.17) shows that i’s ex-ante
expected payo↵ will be EUEXi ( i, ⇢ j) =  i(1  ⇢ j(1 ⇡D)  12 i). Now suppose that i is inexpert.
Equation (3.4) shows that i’s best response will be
⌘BRi (⇢ j) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
{1} if ⇢ j < 12(1 ⇡D)
{0} if ⇢ j > 12(1 ⇡D)
[0,1] if ⇢ j = 12(1 ⇡D) .
Finally, Equation (3.19) shows that i’s ex-ante expected payo↵ will be EUIXi (⌘i, ⇢ j) = ⌘i(
1
2  
(1 ⇡D)⇢ j). Therefore, if   j = ⌘ j, i’s best response and ex-ante expected payo↵ will be inde-
pendent of ✏ j. Since i’s perceptiveness is defined by ✏ j, i’s best response and ex-ante expected
payo↵ will be independent of i’s perceptiveness if   j = ⌘ j.2
2Recall that i’s degree of perceptiveness is depicted by |✏ j   12 |, as described in Footnote 11 of Chapter 3.
Appendix C
Appendices for Chapter 4
C.1 Microfoundations
Player i’s profit upon entering the market is given by ⇡i = (a bqj bqi)qi  i. When i decides
to not enter the market, i earns zero profit. Therefore, if neither player enters the market, zero
quantity will be produced and no surplus will be realized.
If both players enter, they will each produce a quantity of Qi,D = a3b , thereby making
QT,D = 2a3b and PD =
a
3 .
1 In this case, consumer surplus is CS D = 2a
2
9b , total producer surplus
2 is
PS T,D = 2a
2
9b   i   j, and total surplus is TS D = 4a
2
9b   i   j. Furthermore, player i’s producer
surplus is PS i,D = a
2
9b    i, so ⇡D = a
2
9b . The subscript labelled as “D” indicates the duopolistic
case. Figure C.1 graphically depicts the surplus regions arising from a duopoly.
Finally, if only one player enters, the player, i, entering the market will produce a quantity of
QT,M = a2b , while the other player will produce nothing, thereby making PM =
a
2 .
3 In this case,
consumer surplus is CS M = a
2
8b , total producer surplus, which is solely realized by the player
entering the market, is PS T,M = a
2
4b    i, hence ⇡M = a
2
4b , and total surplus is TS M =
3a2
8b    i.
1These values can be obtained by using standard unconstrained optimization techniques, taking first-order
conditions with respect to qi.
2When calculating producer surplus, I include the market-entry fee as opposed to excluding it. Thus, producer
surplus here can be considered as earned profit.
3Again, these values can be obtained by using standard unconstrained optimization techniques, taking first-
order conditions with respect to qi.
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The subscript labelled as “M” indicates the monopolistic case. Figure C.2 graphically depicts
the surplus regions arising from a monopoly.
Throughout my analysis, I normalize ⇡M = 1. This implies a normalization of a
2
b = 4.
Subsequently, for Cournot competition, ⇡D = 49 , CS D =
8
9 , PS T,D =
8
9    i     j, and TS D =
16
9    i     j. Also, for Cournot competition when i enters the market and j does not enter the
market, CS M = 12 , PS T,D = 1    i, and TS D = 32    i.
Figure C.1: Diagram displaying the consumer and post-entry producer surplus for a duopoly
under Cournot competition.
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Figure C.2: Diagram displaying the consumer and post-entry producer surplus for a monopoly
under Cournot competition.
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